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ABSTRACT 
 
Like all Americans, the Native peoples were swept into the crucible that 
was the Civil War.  Although under no obligation to participate in the 
conflagration, many Indian tribes joined one side, some even both factions.  The 
Catawba peoples of South Carolina were, among these, fully committing to the 
Confederacy.  That seemingly contradictory response in the light of their 
treatment by South Carolina is the subject of this thesis. 
Before examining their Civil War response, the Introduction traces their 
relationship with the white colonists of Carolina from its founding in 1670 
through the end of the American Revolution.  With this background, the direct 
antebellum period is explored in Chapter I, especially the watershed Nations Ford 
Treaty.  The Civil War itself and its military and homeland effects on Catawbas is 
the subject of Chapter II.  Finally, the changes or continuity as a result of this 
experience are examined in Chapter III.  At each stage the responses of the other 
Southeastern Indians to the same circumstances are historiographically reviewed, 
especially to attempt an understanding of what motivated the Catawbas’ unique 
response to the Civil War and the consequences of that choice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis will explore why the Catawba Indians, a small tribe native to 
South Carolina, supported and even fought and died for the Confederate States of 
America in the Civil War.  At casual glance, this is essentially a non-question; 
they were residents of that state, and the Confederacy was overwhelmingly 
embraced by South Carolinians regardless of whether they owned slaves or not.  
But when one considers the Catawba Nation’s contributions to South Carolina 
and the treatment they received in response to their loyalty, the obvious answer 
fades into a study of the complex racial, social, and economic dynamics of the 
antebellum South. 
Specifically, this thesis will argue that the primary motivation for the 
Catawbas’ Confederate military service resulted from the biracial society that was 
thrust upon them after 1800.  This Indian nation was the third racial group in that 
explosive mix, and how they reacted to those circumstances is the history and 
connection this paper will relate.   
Much has been written about black slaves and white planters and farmers, 
the two prominent groups in the plantation economy of the colonial and 
antebellum South.  Yet historical research remains an evolving effort, and in the 
American South it has expanded to include other groups:  women, children, 
immigrants, and frontier pioneers all lived within this overarching biracial 
framework, as did the Indians.   
Within the history of the Indians, the Catawbas of South Carolina appear 
to have endured a unique experience.  The vast majority of native peoples 
originally in the South have vanished.  Some tribes, like the Westo and the 
PeeDee, became extinct, the victims of disease and war.  Others moved from the 
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area.  The Tuscarora ended up in New York, the Savannahs shifted to the Ohio 
Valley.  Others—the Five Civilized Tribes—were forcibly moved west.   
The Catawba people stayed (or alternatively were trapped) in South 
Carolina, the epicenter of the sectional struggles that culminated in the Civil War.  
Their response of unconditional, unwavering support of the Confederate ideals 
was not a given however. 
 Historians have given different interpretations as to why the Catawbas 
joined South Carolina in the Confederate cause.  Still, no one has specifically seen 
the Catawbas’ racial quandary as the primary, overriding motivation.  A brief 
review of the historiography is in order. 
Douglas Summer Brown published the first comprehensive studies of the 
Catawba people.  Her 1953 A City Without Cobwebs related the history of Rock 
Hill, South Carolina, the ancestral home of the Catawbas.1  In an early chapter, 
Brown discusses the tribe and its relations with the white settlers through 1840.  
In 1966, she published The Catawba Indians—People of the River, the first 
comprehensive study of the Catawba people, which is considered the classic 
standard by Catawba historians.2  Its detailed examination of Catawba history 
devotes only three paragraphs to their Civil War experience.  She argues that 
white coercion was the cause of Catawba participation in the war.  Chapman J. 
Milling in his 1969 study of the Catawbas, Red Carolinians, writes only one 
sentence about the Civil War and does not attempt any explanation of their 
possible motivations.3  Charles M. Hudson in The Catawba Nation (1970) 
presents an anthropologic study of the Catawbas.4  He mentions their Civil War 
                                                
1 Douglas Summers Brown, A City Without Cobwebs-A History of Rock Hill, South Carolina 
(Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 1953). 
2 Douglas Summers Brown, The Catawba Indians-People of the River (Columbia: The University 
of South Carolina Press, 1966). 
3 Chapman J. Milling, Red Carolinians (Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 1969). 
4 Charles M. Hudson, The Catawba Nation (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1970). 
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experience briefly on only two occasions.  Significantly, he attempts to place this 
chapter of the nation’s history in the context of their place and role in antebellum 
Southern society, finding them an increasingly isolated minority.  Their answer 
was to continue supporting the South Carolina government, which Hudson gives 
as their reason for Confederate military service. 
Later, historians would expand on Hudson’s anthropological theme.  
James H. Merrill has written two books on the Catawbas:  The Indians’ New 
World (1989), which traces their history from colonial times through the removal 
period of the 1830s,5 and The Catawbas (also 1989), which continues his study of 
the Catawba Nation to the present day, but it only contained one sentence, their 
Civil War service, stating that sacrifice did not lessen the racial prejudice the 
Catawbas suffered postwar.6  However, in his 1984 article in The Journal of 
Southern History, Merrill traces the “education” of the Catawba people from 
colonial colorblindness to antipathy toward blacks in the period of slavery and 
cotton expansion.  Especially significant, according to Merrell, was the growing 
white propensity to link them with blacks, and the Catawbas’ desire to fight this 
association.  Unlike this thesis, Merrell never offers this racial antipathy toward 
blacks as a possible cause for their Civil War service. 
Two historians contributed much to our understanding of the Civil War 
efforts of the Catawba soldiers.  Thomas J. Blumer has written several books and 
articles about the Catawba, having worked with and studied them for forty years.  
In 1995, he published an article describing their Confederate Civil War service.  
Blumer specifically attributed their military support to a tradition of helping South 
Carolina continuously since colonial times.7  In Between Two Fires, Laurence 
                                                
5 James H. Merrell, The Indians’ New World-The Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European 
Contact through the Era of Removal (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989). 
6 James H. Merrell, The Catawbas (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1989). 
7 Thomas J. Blumer, “Record of the Catawba Indians’ Confederate Service,” South Carolina 
Historical Magazine Vol. 96, No. 3, July 1995. 
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Hauptman masterfully traces the Civil War military experience of every Indian 
tribe that fought for both the Confederacy and the Union.8  In discussing the 
Catawbas, Hauptman postulates four possible motivations for their participation 
in the war.  One of these is the tribe’s economic and psychological dependence by 
1860 on South Carolina, but the racial parameters of this dependence remain 
untouched.  
 This study covers the period from 1840 through 1890, the fifty years 
bracketing the American Civil War.  By 1890, the census for Catawba Township, 
York County, South Carolina, enumerated only sixty Catawbas.9  They were the 
remnant of the proud, populous tribe that numbered in the thousands in 1670, 
when Carolina began to be populated by Europeans and Africans.  Analyzing the 
movements and events of these fifty years will give insight into the decline and 
dispersal that became a seismic shift for these people.   
 To explain this seismic shift, we must go back to the 1700s when the 
process commenced.  This prologue will show how the Catawbas interacted with 
the white man, and how, after 1800, these interactions—resulting from the rapidly 
increasing settler population—undermined and destroyed their world. 
In 1796 George Washington made this entry in his diary: 
 
I have been incommoded, at this place (Mount Vernon), by a visit of 
several days, from a party of a dozen Catawbas, and should wish while I 
am at this retreat, to avoid a repetition of such guests.  (They) seemed to 
be under apprehension that some attempts were making to deprive them of 
(the lands) which were secured for them by Treaty.10   
 
In that meeting, the Catawba headsmen had come to petition an old and 
respected friend.  Washington was very familiar with the Catawbas.  As a young 
                                                
8 Laurence M. Hauptman, Between Two Fires-American Indians in the Civil War (New York:  
Free Press Paperbacks, 1995). 
9 “Population Schedules of the Tenth Census of the United States, 1880, South Carolina” 
(Washington, D.C.:  Census Office, 1880) Section T-1243:  Williamsburg and York Counties. 
10 Merrell, The Indians’ New World, 276. 
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colonial British officer in Virginia, he had recruited them to fight against the 
French and their Indian allies.  Subsequently he had witnessed their military skill 
and loyalty once more in the Revolutionary War. 
 What was the reason these representatives of an extremely small South 
Carolina tribe had journeyed to consult with the President, and why would 
Washington even host them at his home?  What of these Catawba lands that 
Washington alludes to?  Most significantly, what are we to make of his annoyed 
reaction to their visit? 
 Washington’s brief, almost terse entry captures the changes the Catawba 
Indians had undergone in slightly more than a century of experience with 
European settlement.   
 The Catawbas had first encountered the white man in one of DeSoto’s 
expeditions, led by Juan Pardo and his military party in 1540.  After this initial 
contact there was only sporadic contact with inland traders until 1670.  At that 
time two hundred settlers, under the Lords’ Proprietor charter from Charles II, 
established the Carolina colony at the mouth of the Ashley River.  From the 
beginning, the colonists’ contact with this native people was mutually cordial.  As 
the colony prospered, the Catawbas proved invaluable in many aspects:  as a 
buffer from potentially hostile tribes, and also from the French and Spanish to the 
West and South; as trade partners; as hired agents to track and return runaway 
slaves; and as teachers in understanding this new land.  But for the Catawba, there 
was an increasing downside to white familiarity.  The colonists came to want 
more of the Indians’ lands, feared reprisal attacks, and especially became 
terrorized at the thought of a combined revolt by a rapidly growing slave 
population in concert with the Indians.  Already by 1671 Carolina’s early leaders 
concluded that the key to managing the local Indians was to recruit them as slave 
catchers by offering guns and ammunition as incentive.  To pay for the weapons, 
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the native clients raided other Indians for captives to sell as slaves, or tracked and 
returned runaway Africans.  The gun trade rendered the natives dependent upon 
weapons they could neither make nor repair.  (Thus) the Carolinians gained 
mastery over a network of native peoples, securing their own frontier and 
wreaking havoc on a widening array of Indians.11 
 Without guns and ammunition, the Indians could not hunt for food or 
skins to trade, and faced the very real threat of being slave-raided themselves by 
better armed rivals. 
Fortunately, we have a witness to those times.  John Lawson lived in the 
early Carolina colony, and even then recognized the purposeful use of trade to 
gain mastery over the Indians.  Lawson is uniquely placed to our understanding of 
the Catawbas and the other peoples in this earliest colonial period.  In 1701, he set 
out to observe and record the native peoples and their land.  Eight years later he 
published A New Voyage to the Carolinas.  Lawson’s portrayal of the traditional 
Catawba life before it was irrevocably changed by European settlement is 
invaluable.  His narrative is the first recorded description of the Catawbas in the 
English language.  He chronicles the abandoned Catawba villages and the greatly 
reduced numbers of them, decimated by white culture, diseases, and wars.  
Throughout his description of the Catawbas he knew and observed, he also 
attempted to interpret their experience.  Lawson’s admiration for their character 
and way of life in this early period is telling, as when he wrote: 
 
They are better to us than we are to them.  They always give us food at 
their quarters, and take care we are armed against Hunger and Thirst.  We 
do not do so by them.  We look upon them with scorn and 
distain…though, if well examined, we shall find that, for all our religion 
and culture, we possess more moral deformities and evils than these 
savages do, or are acquainted with.12 
                                                
11 Alan Taylor, American Colonies (New York:  Penguin Press, 2001), 228. 
12 Taylor, American Colonies, 426. 
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 Population estimates done by ethnologist James Mooney help place a 
human face on this devastation.  In the earliest colonial period (c.1682) there were 
as many as six thousand in the tribe.  Increasing white contact with the migration 
of the colonists onto the Piedmont resulted in a drastic drop in Catawba numbers 
to about sixteen hundred in 1728, a seventy percent (70%) decline in less than 
fifty years.  Twelve hundred remained by the time of the French and Indian War, 
and by the end of the Revolutionary War, only 250 survived.  The Catawba had a 
staggering 95% mortality in only one hundred years of contact with the white 
man.13  Warfare caused very little of this devastation.  Diseases were the most 
significant cause, but guns, alcohol, and other means from the white culture 
contributed to it.  By Washington’s assessment in 1796, the resulting loss of self-
esteem and the waning of their influence rendered the Catawbas progressively 
more peripheral to the emerging white power structure.  In 1761, the Catawba 
were still “as brave fellows as any on the Continent of America,” but by 1784 
they were “such as would excite the derision and contempt of the more Western 
savages.”14 
 By the 1740s the Catawba were already comprehending their ever-more 
precarious situation and fashioning their own answers.  Grim as these numbers 
are, they would have been much worse except for a social-ethnic phenomenon 
that was occurring during this period.  As the Catawba tribe itself struggled to 
adapt and survive, it became the nexus for the remnants of other Carolina tribes 
unable to do the same.  The Catawbas in the mid-17th century provided the means 
of survival for their fellow Southeastern Siouan language peoples, and even for 
unrelated peoples from other language stock tribes.  In Douglas Summers 
                                                
13 Cole J. Blease, “The Catawba Indians of South Carolina,” Congressional Record-Senate, 72nd 
Congress, Volume 63, February 26, 1930, 4258.  Blease cites Mooney’s 1894 monograph “Siouan 
Tribes of the East.” 
14 Blease, “The Catawba Indians,” 4258. Again Blease cites Mooney. 
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Brown’s analysis of this melding movement, the Catawba tribe evolved into the 
Catawba Nation.  This amalgamated entity now sheltered, sustained and 
incorporated these Indians on the verge of extinction. 
 Thirty known tribes of Indians have resided in South Carolina since the 
coming of the white man.  The Catawbas are the sole survivors.  These Siouan 
tribes, plus fragments of other depleted bands of Indians of mixed origin who took 
refuge with them following various conflicts with the white men, eventually made 
up what in historical terms has been called “The Catawba Nation.”  Twenty-two 
tribes formed the Catawba Nation as early as 1743.15    
Indeed, this process was noted by James Adair, an Indian trader and agent 
with the Catawbas during this period.  Adair described this blending of diverse 
peoples into a surviving whole.  He noted the cacophony of over twenty dialects 
being spoken in the Catawba villages, which resulted from the Catawbas making 
a new composite society with the refugees of other broken tribes.  Also, by 1740, 
the resulting Catawba Nation was increasingly dependent on South Carolina.16  
The other survival mechanism of the Catawba Nation was what had always 
ensured their existence in the past: their fierce warrior tradition.  However, now 
they fought in diminished numbers. And they fought on two fronts. 
The first front was a continuation of the pre-Colonial battles with their 
Indian enemies.  For the Catawba, the 18th century was a period of a constant war 
against two native enemies:  the Iroquois to the north and the Cherokee to the 
west.  The protracted Catawba-Iroquois conflict was, however, the far more 
consequential.  This warfare lasted more than one hundred years.  The Catawbas 
were essentially under siege for this entire period, unable even to venture out in 
                                                
15 Brown, The Catawba Indians, 1-5. 
16 Charles M. Hudson, The Catawba Indians of South Carolina (Athens:  The University of 
Georgia Press, 1969), 47-48. 
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hunting parties for food.  In 1751, King Hagler, the beloved leader of the 
Catawbas, sought peace.  Hagler led a delegation of six aboard a ship from 
Charleston harbor to New York City, and then up the Hudson to Albany.  There 
this Catawba peace party and the Iroquois leaders spent two months working out a 
truce, then an acceptable plan to end hostilities.  Despite sporadic conflicts over 
the next fifty years, the Catawba-Iroquois warfare ceased. 
The second front was opened as the Catawbas emerged as trusted allies in 
British colonial rule, and subsequently to the new Federal government and the 
State of South Carolina.  From first white contact, the Catawba willingly aided the 
South Carolina government, and assisted the settlers in their conflicts.  The 
Catawbas’ initial aid was to control hostile native peoples that threatened the early 
colony.  As settlement progressed, the Catawbas fought the Indian allies of 
Britain’s foes, especially the Cherokees who sided with France.  This occasioned 
Washington’s recruitment of their aid in that conflict.  This alliance culminated 
with the colonial government rewarding the Catawba Nation an immense 
144,000-acre land grant surrounding their ancestral homes near Rock Hill, South 
Carolina.  This was done under the Treaty of Augusta in 1763, the same one 
mentioned by Washington in his diary.  But even service and sacrifice in the 
American Revolution couldn’t preserve this grant; sweeping changes were 
evident within two generations of its issue.  The fear of loss that the Catawbas felt 
was not without reason. 
Lawson, Adair, and finally Washington, had all traveled across the same 
Piedmont area, seeking to learn about its peoples.  But irrevocable changes had 
occurred in the one hundred years between those travels.  Lawson and Adair had 
found a land where the Catawba exercised influential power and control.  By the 
1790s that same land was firmly the ascendant white man’s world.  The Indians—
now the intruders—were fading in importance and influence.  The former 
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colonists had secured their own nation, displacing the Indians and any power they 
might have had previously.  This shift had been under way before 1712 and would 
continue past 1796, but by then the balanced had tipped forever away from the 
Indians.  
Washington and his fellow Americans were not ungrateful, but the status 
of the Catawbas as significant military associates and a useful source of trade and 
guidance to the new lands had irrevocably disappeared in the rush of these 
changes.  The Catawbas no longer commanded attention or respect.  They had 
become, in the dominant white view, an almost annoying, obstructive, and 
marginal people.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
1840-1860—THE NATIONS FORD TREATY:   
ITS ORGINS AND LASTING EFFECTS 
 
1840 was a watershed year for the Catawba people.  On March 13, a treaty 
was formalized between their Indian Nation and the State of South Carolina.  
Known as the Nations Ford Treaty, it formalized their deepest fear:  after ceding 
their land, their life-source, they were to be removed.  George Washington’s diary 
observation of only fifty years previously proved to be prescient. 
This loss of their homeland was not an abrupt event.  1840 may have been 
the marker, but the process had begun decades before.  The Treaty was a direct 
outcome of the rapid growth of cotton in the South.  Cotton had become King 
after the invention of the gin in 1793, reshaping both the economics and 
demographics of South Carolina.  Planters rapidly moved into the Piedmont, 
clearing the forests to take advantage of the fertile cotton-growing soil.  To 
produce the cotton they brought their slaves in ever-increasing numbers.  Between 
1790 and 1810, the Piedmont witnessed a 194% growth in slave population, an 
increase far greater than any other section of the State.17  The frontiersmen and 
traders were pushed to the West, and the remaining Catawba began to be 
pressured socially and economically.  No one thought that the Catawbas’ 
Piedmont land was now fit only for the Indians.  These economic pressures and 
the chain of events they unleashed actually began well before the 1840 takeover 
of the Catawba lands.18  Before examining the condition and actions of the 
                                                
17 Rachel N. Klein, Unification of a Slave State:  The Rise of the Planter Class in the South 
Carolina Backcountry, 1760-1808 (Chapel Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 
251 and 253. 
18 Hudson, The Catawba Nation, 61. 
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Catawbas in this crucible period, we first need to understand the background 
events and dynamics that precipitated this unparalleled shift for them from 1800 
forward. 
As the Northeast became increasingly industrialized in the years after the 
War of 1812, the states of the Southeast intensified their agricultural dependence 
rather than diversify their economic base.  Agriculturalists began an intensive 
search for a new staple crop that would be lucrative and adaptable to the 
increasingly settled Piedmont.  Cotton was easily grown in the Upcountry, but its 
economic impact was severely limited by the labor-intensive separation of the 
fiber from the cotton seed.  Around 1800, two factors combined to radically 
change cotton production.  One was the invention of a practical cotton gin.  With 
early gins, a worker could clean five pounds of cotton a week.  Whitney’s gin, 
before any modifications, enabled that worker to ready fifty pounds in a single 
day.  Coupled with growth of England’s textile industry and the fledgling New 
England textile industry, the demand for cotton escalated.  South Carolina had 
found and embraced the anchor to her agricultural economy and society.  Between 
1790 and 1800 alone, the state’s cotton exports soared from 9,840 pounds to 
greater than 6,425,000.19   
Rachael Klein traces how this phenomenal cotton growth in the early 
1800s led to the political unification of South Carolina’s Lowcountry planters and 
Upcountry yeoman farmers.  Before cotton expansion these two significant 
political groups and their sections were diverging politically, primarily over 
slavery.  Most Upcountry inhabitants were yeoman non-slaveholders.  The 
plantations that depended upon slave labor were primarily in the Lowcountry.  Its 
leaders feared that the growing yeoman farmers’ spirit of republicanism would 
                                                
19 Klein, Unification of a Slave State, 247-248. 
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doom support for slavery.  Klein notes that in 1800 most of the wealthy planters 
inhabited the coastal areas, with only a scattering inland.  Klein convincingly 
shows that the spread of the new cotton plantations—and with them slavery—to 
the Upcountry caused the transformation of these diverse spheres into a cohesive 
political and economic union, a remarkable phenomenon.  The advance of the 
cotton-slave culture unified the politically divided planters and yeomen farmers, 
who forged a common ethos and mindset, united South Carolinians, and 
ultimately led to the state’s pivotal role in Secession.  As Klein notes:  
 
The inland spread of cotton culture affected the course of South Carolina, 
and, for that matter United States history, not by creating a class of inland 
planters, but by increasing their numbers and enhancing their regional 
power…Throughout the later eighteenth century, the primary cause of 
sectional tension (in South Carolina) had been the small slaveholders and 
non-slaveholders who had comprised the inland majority.  Opponents of 
inland demands for political parity…feared that the democratic-republican 
vision that prevailed in the backcountry might develop, among yeomen, 
into a more dangerous assault on South Carolina planters.20 
 
The planter classes of both regions united, forging a society that the 
yeoman farmers of the upcountry bought into, and indeed became dependent upon 
both economically and socially.  With more inland settlers acquiring slaves and 
more inland areas potentially vulnerable to black majorities, coastal 
representatives could finally rest assured that backcountry republicanism would 
not be a spearhead of antislavery.  The reapportionment Reform of 1808 both 
reflected and resolved fundamental coastal concerns by ensuring that Black Belt 
districts would control the state legislature.  All citizens and all areas of South 
Carolina came together in support of the slavery that drove their cotton economic 
engine.   
 
                                                
20 Klein, Unification of a Slave State, 238. 
 14 
Cotton had not been responsible for the advance of leading inland families 
to planter status, nor had cotton alone prompted the formation of 
interregional political alliances.  Bound together by their joint involvement 
in the slave system, inland and coastal leaders had fundamental interests in 
common even before the Revolution. 
   
What cotton expansion did was to reassure coastal leaders that the 
backcountry could be a trusted ally in the struggle to protect slavery from 
any possible interference.21 
 
 For the Catawbas, this explosive expansion of cotton and slavery was a 
double-edged sword.  In addition to eventually claiming their land, it acutely 
focused their status and self-consciousness as the third race in a now set biracial 
society.  Catawba historian James Merrell emphasizes the crisis that this created 
in the Catawba people.  “In this color-conscious society, anyone with dark skin 
was in danger of being classified as ‘Colored.’  No wonder the Catawba were said 
by one white observer to ‘live in obsessed fear of being regarded as colored and 
classified with Negroes.’”  This association would become a recurring vital 
concern for the Indians.22  Both Hudson and Merrell raised the issue of racial 
tension, but never ascribe this fear of identification with blacks as the cause of 
their Civil War sacrifices.  
 David Hutchison provides us with a first-hand account of what was 
happening to the Catawbas as these economic and social forces were evolving.  In 
that period he and his family lived on the Catawba tract with a handful of other 
white families.  There they enjoyed mutual harmony and respect with the 
Catawbas.  Hutchison begins by stating his qualifications.  “I am,” he wrote, “one 
of the oldest settlers on The Indian Land, and one of the commissioners who 
made the Treaty.”23  Hutchison then recalled the loyalty, military 
                                                
21 Klein, Unification of a Slave State, 267-268. 
22 Merrell, The Catawbas, 66-67. 
23 David Hutchison, “The Catawba Indians by Request” Columbia: The Palmetto State Banner, 
August 30, 1849, 1. The Draper Manuscript Collection, Vol. 10-“Frontier Wars,” 99-101. 
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accomplishments, and sacrifice of the Catawba warriors he had personally served 
with during the Revolution.  Because of this experience, he afterwards settled on 
Catawba land, learning first-hand about all the Catawba people, not just their 
warriors.  Hutchinson had thus befriended all tribal members, had known the 
Catawbas for over seventy years, and had lived among them for over half a 
century.  He describes these people at that time as follows: 
 
At this time I think they numbered from 150 to 200 fighting men, all 
temperate, and the women remarkably so.  I believe they could not have 
been persuaded to taste liquor…The women were industrious and made 
corn. 
 
 After the Revolution, there was an influx of white settlers, Hutchison 
among them.  Welcomed to settle by the Catawbas, these white settlers were all 
Revolutionary War veterans without sufficient land to support their young 
families.  Hutchison noted that during the Revolution these men 
 
…had become acquainted with a number of Indians, and were favorites 
with them.  (these fellow-veterans) were encouraged by the Indians and 
the whites already settled, to come and live on their land, which most of 
them did.  They commenced poor in property, but rich in independence.  
The motto was to live sparingly and work hard. 
 
Thus, the initial, few white settlers on the Indian Land were landowners and 
trusted friends of the Catawbas.  When the cotton flood burst on all of them in the 
early 1800s, the Indians’ land became known and the precedent for white 
settlement had been set.  As the number of new settlers mushroomed, the Indians 
had “given up all idea of farming.  The Indians commenced renting their Land, 
appointing three agents to act for them.”24  This development immediately and 
forever changed the Catawba/white settler relationship, as the formal lease 
business approach replaced the personal relationships of a few years previously. 
                                                
24 Hutchison, “The Catawba Indians by Request,” 1-2. 
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 By the early 1800s—a mere generation after the Revolution—these 
dynamics forever changed when South Carolina implemented the “right” of the 
Catawbas to lease their land for agriculture.  Leasing their prime lands for 
extremely low rates only delayed the inevitable process of the Catawbas losing 
their homelands.  The leaseholders were supposed to pay a substantial bounty 
bonus up-front when the lease was signed, then significant rent payments each of 
the ninety-nine years of the term of the lease.  The extant lease documents tell a 
much different story.  In reality, the average rent was only a quarter of what the 
law proscribed, and even fell as low as 12.5 cents.  Equally deceptive was the 
settlers’ version of the bounty.  Most were never paid. When it was, the 
leaseholders viewed the bounty as an advance on future rent due, not up-front 
money as it was intended.25   
 As the pressure for more cotton land escalated, so did the debate in South 
Carolina about the seizure of the territory granted to the Catawbas in 1763-1764.  
Despite growing pressure to give up their land from Washington’s time, the 
Catawba had remained adamant.  In 1839, the South Carolina House of 
Representatives authorized a Commission to negotiate with the tribe to cede their 
now-valuable land.26  Two previous attempts by the Legislature to purchase the 
Catawba lands failed because the state negotiators were unknown to the Indians.  
Now the Legislature appointed five with whom the Indians were well acquainted.  
David Hutchison was named the chief South Carolina negotiator.  The personal 
nature and good intentions of the 1839 negotiators toward the Catawbas is 
captured when Hutchison relates how he himself consulted with North Carolina 
authorities about the proposed exchange land to be purchased there.  Only when 
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satisfied that the tract was “suitable location for the Indians,” and that relocation 
was both desired by the Catawbas and would benefit them, did Hutchison and his 
fellow negotiators conclude the 1840 Treaty with their friends and neighbors.27 
 These five commissioners also wrote a report on their negotiations with 
the tribe.  That Report of the Commissioners documented what life was like for 
the Catawba at this time.  Ironically praising their loyal service in the 
Revolutionary War, the report then describes the tribe’s current condition.  At that 
time, few Catawbas were still living on their traditional land in York County.  
“From a once populous tribe,” it noted, “they dwindled down to twelve men, 
thirty-six women, and forty young ones.”  The Treaty negotiators found that “The 
Catawba have leased out every foot of land they held within their boundary.  For 
the last few years they have been wondering through the country forming kinds of 
camps without any homes…and destitute of any species of (personal) property 
save dogs and a few worthless horses.”  The Commissioners next related that even 
this early the Catawba seemed desirous of having a tract of land on which they 
could again “settle…and build little houses and procure some cattle, hogs, and 
poultry.”  Leasing their lands had essentially made them homeless at home. This 
report confirmed that the wandering life of the Catawba had been going on since 
the leasing period began around 1800.28 
 Even at this stage one can detect stirrings of conscience and obligation.  
The Commissioners reported that during the negotiations “their Chief (General 
Kegg) remarked that when they were a strong Nation and the State weak, they 
came to Her support, and now when the State was strong and the Catawbas weak, 
She ought to assist them.”  This Report of the Commissioners also contains an 
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undeniable sympathy for the Catawbas and a sense of obligation to look out for 
their interests.  However, in spite of the respect these men had for the Catawbas, 
the white stereotype of the Indian still surfaces in their report.  In their aggregate 
experience these men had never heard a charge of dishonesty or meddling against 
any Catawba.  They “have always been harmless, peaceable and friendly, but (as 
is perhaps characteristic of Indians generally) they are indolent and improvident 
and seem to have little idea of laying up for their future wants.”29  
Notwithstanding their military service and being good neighbors, the Tribal 
members were still viewed as being Indians, that is lazy and lacking any concept 
or capability of changing themselves for the better.  This stereotype proved 
pervasive and persistent.  After Hutchison and the Treaty negotiators the sense of 
responsibility for the Catawba people also continued, primarily by their white 
neighbors, by the state Catawba Indian agents, and even by South Carolina’s 
governors.  For their part, the Catawbas were unable to shake a similar sense of 
obligation to South Carolina, no matter how they were maltreated.  This pattern of 
interdependence and caring suggests paternalism. 
 Eugene D. Genovese has thoroughly examined paternalism in the 
antebellum South.  His goal was to understand the relationship between planters 
and slaves. 
 
The Old South, black and white, created a historically unique kind of 
paternalistic society…Southern paternalism, like every other paternalism, 
had little to do with Ole Massa’s ostensible benevolence, kindness, and 
good cheer.  It grew out of the necessity to discipline and morally justify a 
system of exploitation, but it simultaneously encouraged cruelty and 
hatred.  The racial distinction between master and slave heightened the 
tension inherent in an unjust social order.30 
 
                                                
29 “Report of April 3, 1840,” 235-237. 
30 Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll-The World the Slaves Made (New York:  Pantheon 
Books, 1974), 6. 
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Clearly the Catawba people did not share the same relationship with whites as the 
slaves did.  Nevertheless there were significant similarities to the form of 
paternalism interactions that Genovese describes.    
 Genovese stresses the hegemonic role of the planter class in Southern 
society of this prewar period.  Indeed, it is their undue influence over other South 
Carolinians that made possible the social and political unification chronicled by 
Klein.  The Catawbas, too, seemed to be have been entrapped in the social and 
political domination of this sweeping dynamic.  Two factors of Genovese’s 
antebellum paternalism are particularly applicable to the Catawbas.  First, 
Genovese stresses the dual dynamics of the plantation system.  It was a social 
confine in which both slave owners and slaves exerted power or “agency.”  The 
slaves had reciprocal power to influence the planters, and they used it.  The slaves 
were forced to accept slavery, but at the same time, they were able to interact 
within it, especially to be able to exert influence on the “controlling” masters.  
The Catawbas likewise came to assert an increasing initiative in their relationship 
with white South Carolina, and, thus, were not content to passively accept the 
government’s treatment of them.  Their “agency” is a significant part of the story 
of this period of 1840 through the outbreak of the Civil War. 
 The second significant effect of paternalism on the slave as Genovese 
argues was to make the crushing system seem ironically personal.  The whole 
thrust of events might be destructive to them, but they had a personal history and 
relationship with their master and his family.  The Catawbas, for their part, had a 
similar strong and binding relationship with white South Carolinians, a 
relationship that had been ongoing almost two centuries.  Significantly, both sides 
were unable to abandon each other in spite of powerful arguments and attempts to 
do so.   
 20 
 By 1840, the lines of the South Carolina-Catawba conflict were well-
drawn, and the two protagonists were to enter a period from 1840 to 1860 of 
settling the conditions of the Catawbas’ ceding of their land and their removal 
from South Carolina.  The Nations Ford Treaty can be viewed as the opening 
skirmish of this crucial conflict.  
 The 1840 Nations Ford Treaty was a single, simple sheet of paper 
containing three brief paragraphs.  At that time its eventual significance could not 
possibly have been known.  The Treaty, however, provided the basis for 
understanding subsequent events. 
 
 
A Treaty 
 
Entered into at the Nation Ford, Catawba, between the Chiefs and Head 
Men of the Catawba Indians of the one part, and Commissioners 
appointed under a Resolution of the Legislature, passed December 1839. 
 
Article 1st.  The Chiefs and Head Men of the Catawba Indians, for 
themselves and the entire Nation, hereby agree to cede, sell, transfer, and 
convey to the State of South Carolina all their right, title and interest to 
this boundry of land, lying on both sides of the Catawba River, situate in 
the districts of York and Lancaster, and which are represented in a plat of 
survey of fifteen miles square, made by Samuel Wiley, and dated the 
twenty second day of February, one thousand seven hundred, and sixty 
four, and now on file in the office of Secretary of State. 
 
Article 2d.  The Commissioners on their part engage, in behalf of the 
State, to furnish the Catawba Indians with a tract of land of the value of 
five thousand dollars:  three hundred acres of which is to be good arable 
lands, fit for cultivation, to be purchased in Haywood County, N.C., or in 
some other mountainous or thinly populated region where the said Indians 
may desire:  and if no such tract can be procured to their satisfaction, they 
shall be entitled to receive the foregoing amount in cash from the State. 
 
Article 3d.  The Commissioners further engage that the State shall pay the 
said Catawba Indians two thousand five hundred dollars each year 
thereafter for the space of nine years.  In witness whereof, the contracting 
parties have hereunto set their hands and seals this twentieth day of 
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March, Anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and forty, and in the 
sixty-fourth year of American independence.31 
 
 The Catawbas thus ceded their land to South Carolina.  However, the State 
never allocated the funds nor obtained the required new land for resettlement.  
This failure unleashed a complex chain of events between the tribe and the State 
of South Carolina that was played out over the next generation.  The Nation 
struggled to find a new homeland after the Treaty of 1840, and eventually was 
driven to attempt its own efforts at relocation to the Indian Territory.  Previous 
historians, however, have said very little about how the South Carolina 
Legislature repeatedly frustrated the Catawbas’ endeavors by its continuous 
refusal to honor the state’s obligations under that Nations Ford Treaty.  The 
Legislature’s continued course of obstruction was even more reprehensible when 
one considers the constant reminders and pleas from governors, the Catawba 
agents, and the local York County white citizens.  Being non-literate at this time, 
the Catawbas themselves were seemingly unable to contribute to the 
historiography of their experiences during these prewar decades.  But they 
registered their plight by actions rather than words, as evidenced by their efforts 
to leave South Carolina. 
 In this drama, the South Carolina State Government and the Catawbas 
followed radically different courses.  The State’s goal was clear:  to rid 
themselves of a no longer useful people and take their lands for the new cotton 
plantation society.  Unlike South Carolina, the Catawba seem to have been far 
from having a determined master plan.  They appear rather to have been earnestly 
searching for what would be best for both the individuals and the tribe as a whole.  
Clearly, the very fact that they actively explored their own ways for a solution 
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spoke to their internal conflict and dilemma.  Rather than a deliberate strategy of 
blocking the State of South Carolina’s plans for them, the Catawbas attempted 
independently were attempting to find their own solution.    
 It took only two years for Hutchison to realize that both he and the Indians 
were to be betrayed by South Carolina’s authorities and Legislature.  “As to the 
Indians, I account the Act both just and generous,’ he wrote in 1842, “but as to the 
mode of carrying it out, the reverse.”32  By 1844 the Catawba Indians felt the 
effects of this noncompliance so acutely that they took the unprecedented step of 
presenting a petition directly to the South Carolina House, “praying for a 
distribution of the proceeds of the Catawba Lands lately conveyed by their treaty, 
to enable them to remove to the West.”33  Significantly, this was the first initiative 
undertaken directly by the Tribe. 
 South Carolina’s recurring failure to satisfy its obligations became a 
continuous problem for the Indians as they tried to move ahead.  The legislators 
gave the Catawbas neither land nor means for relocation.  Thus, despite paying 
less than 3.5 cents per acre for the Catawbas’ prime land, both the payments and 
the promised replacement land were never funded.  The Indian lands were 
essentially stolen.  Even more than in George Washington’s time, the Catawba 
Nation had outlived its usefulness to South Carolina, and South Carolinians 
thought they had seen the last of the Catawba.  “As a nation,” Governor David 
Johnson said of the Catawba in 1847, “they are, in effect, dissolved.”34 
 For the Catawba, The Treaty of 1840 meant immediate upheaval and 
uprooting.  In 1841, the Cherokee of Western North Carolina, who had not 
previously been removed, unilaterally accepted about half of their old rivals, and 
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about eighty Catawbas eventually moved there.  They were welcomed by the 
Cherokee but not by North Carolina government officials.  This was hardly 
surprising, since South Carolina had made no effort to purchase the promised tract 
for the Catawba, and by late 1841 North Carolina Governor Morehead not only 
refused to accept the Catawba, but he even sarcastically proposed that the North 
Carolina Cherokee should instead settle themselves in South Carolina.35  But 
official resistance was not what doomed this first attempt to solve the Catawba 
dilemma; rather it was the Catawbas themselves who rejected the generous offer 
of their neighboring Cherokees since they could not put aside their past conflicts.  
Moreover, the Catawba balked at giving up their customs and language, feeling 
they were being subsumed into the Cherokee culture.  Long accustomed to 
assimilating other tribes, they could not negotiate a complete role change.  
Gradually most moved back to South Carolina, squatting on their former lands or 
rejoining the Catawba who had remained behind.  South Carolina officials finally 
placed the Catawbas on six hundred and thirty acres of the original lands granted 
in 1763 near Rock Hill.  This was but a small, unproductive section of their 
former holdings, and even this land was intended to be a transient holding area 
pending removal.36  This land, today known as the Old Reservation, remains the 
Catawba home. 
 The vacillation of South Carolina continued through the 1840s.  The 
Executive Branch realized the need for an equitable solution, and repeatedly 
urged the Legislature to honor its obligations.  Governor Hammond, in his 
Legislative Message of November 28, 1843, informed the recalcitrant lawmakers 
of his personal interest in the Catawbas’ plight resulting from the legislators’ 
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inaction.  Hammond had, he noted, made “very particular enquires into the 
condition of the Catawba Indians.  I visited their neighborhood myself and 
conversed with most of their head men.”  Governor Hammond concluded his 
Message by acknowledging that relocation to North Carolina was not an option 
unless South Carolina reversed its inaction.  He proposed a plan for resolution of 
the stalemate that had been getting wide attention by both the Catawbas and the 
State, which was to allow and aid “the Catawba…to be removed beyond the 
Mississippi.”37 
 In 1847, South Carolina’s new Governor David Johnson in his turn 
reported to the Legislature on the Catawba.  He confirmed that many had left 
North Carolina to return to their native area, while a few had gone to Tennessee 
and others wanted to go to Georgia to join the Chickasaws.  The failure to 
implement the Treaty of 1840, originally intended to secure them a new 
homeland, was now causing the further dispersion of the tribe.  Johnson urged 
action, but the Legislature responded that they had insufficient information to act 
and recommended yet another commission and inquiry.38  South Carolina was 
caught in an endless cycle of inquires and procrastination. 
 Johnson renewed his efforts the next year.  Another investigation was not 
needed, he argued, as the Catawbas’ condition had been well documented.  In 
another message to the Legislature Johnson relayed the substance of Catawba 
Agent Joseph F. White’s 1847 annual report.  “They still remain in a wandering 
and unsettled condition,” White declared.  “The sums annually distributed 
amongst them do not contribute in any essential degree to their comfort or 
convenience.”  This first-hand report on the Catawbas’ needs exactly echoed the 
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Treaty Commissioners’ Report of 1840.  In a promising departure, Johnson 
proposed an innovative solution.  William H. Thomas, the North Carolina Agent 
for the Cherokee, “has for some time had under his paternal care a portion of the 
Cherokee Indians remaining in the western part of North Carolina.”  Thomas 
noted how an appropriation from the State of North Carolina had allowed him to 
purchase land for his Cherokee people.  He proposed and invited the Catawba to 
settle there on their own section of that tract.  Thomas intended a two-year trial 
period, and the Indians would need continued support from South Carolina until 
they achieved self-sufficiency.  Thomas, who had worked tirelessly for the 
Cherokee, added a qualifier for Catawba participation, indicating that even those 
who worked closely with the Indians couldn’t escape prejudice. 
 
If here, they must quit their dissipation, which if continued, would soon 
cause them to become extinct, and like the Cherokees, support themselves 
and families by labor.  Learning Indians to live without work and to 
depend upon annuities, has a bad effect on them.  The only aid they should 
receive is to support them selves by labor.”39  
 
This innovative approach apparently died in committee, for no mention of its 
development can be found in the South Carolina legislative records.   
 Johnson was succeeded as Governor by Whitemarsh B. Seabrook.  In his 
1849 Governor’s Message, he too chastised South Carolina for not complying 
with its obligations under the Treaty of 1840.  Seabrook feared the very real 
possibility of the Catawba extinction as a result of the Legislature’s intractable 
inaction, noting that “only one woman and her six children were at that time 
living on the tract of traditional homeland in York County that had been set aside 
as a temporary expedient.”  Seabrook specifically ascertained that the amount due 
the Indians at $11,800, and since almost ten years that had passed with no 
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payment, Seabrook calculated the true debt, with interest, was almost twice that 
amount.  Further, Seabrook declared: 
 
When the debt of twenty-one thousand dollars shall be discharged, our 
obligation to minister to the wants of the Catawba Indians will by no 
means have ceased.  To guard with paternal affection these children in 
disposition and intellect is at once dictated by humanity and gratitude.  
The period is perhaps not too remote, when the last sod will be thrown on 
the grave of a people who, individually and collectively, have been 
faithful to the land of their adoption, and in times of peril, zealous in the 
protection of its honor and interests.40 
 
 At this juncture a new agency with a new approach entered the picture: the 
Federal government.  In his same 1849 Legislative Message, Governor Seabrook 
recalled that North Carolina had been proactive in seeking Federal aid for removal 
of the remnant of the Cherokee.  That Federal grant of five thousand dollars, 
however, only applied to North Carolina.  Seabrook reasoned that if his state also 
applied for aid, the means to solve their dilemma could similarly be obtained from 
the national government.  Seabrook quickly asked the Legislature to seek United 
States Government help. 
 
I recommend that an application be made to Congress for an appropriation 
equivalent to the amount set apart for North Carolina, to defray the 
expenses of the removal of the tribe; also, that an agent be appointed …to 
superintend their emigration to the West.41 
 
 Seabrook next appointed a commission to visit the Catawbas and 
determine their condition.  This 1850 report had four findings.  First, the 
commission indicted previous policy, stating bluntly that South Carolina had 
failed its Indians.  Next, members recommended that the tribe be removed to the 
West together with the North Carolina Cherokee.  Thirdly, the members 
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recommended that all the monies due the Catawba be used to create annuities, 
which would be issued to individuals, not paid out as before in cash and supplies.  
Citing the Legislature’s non-compliance, they acknowledged that 
 
The whole amount undertaken to be paid the Indians by the State is now 
past due, and should be funded for their benefit.  The obligation is perfect 
and complete. 
 
Finally, Seabrook’s commission endorsed the Governor’s earlier idea of involving 
the Federal Government.  For the first time South Carolina sought help from 
Washington, D.C.  The legislators hoped to package the Catawbas with the 
Cherokee, or another Federally-protected tribe, in order to get them totally out of 
the Carolinas.  Again, no actual monies would leave the state treasury.  Removal 
of the Catawba to the Indian Territory necessitated the approval and agency of the 
United States Government.42  This new proposal led to a dialogue with the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs over the next few years, but efforts to effect a joint removal of 
both the Cherokee and Catawba were once again frustrated by the Indians, as the 
Catawbas refused to move to the Indian Territory and the Cherokee there refused 
to accept them.43  
 Consideration next turned to placing the Catawbas with another tribe 
already removed to the West.  For the first time, the Catawba stated directly what 
they wanted: they petitioned the Federal government in an attempt to overcome 
South Carolina’s failures.  John Mullay, with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, had 
completed a census of the Catawba remaining in North Carolina, during which 
Catawba Chief William Morrison had “desired me to make it known to the Dept. 
that his people preferred a home with the Chickasaws west; and stated that at one 
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time the Chickasaws had given the Catawba an invitation to settle among them…I 
suggested to Morrison that he should write freely to the Department.” 
 Instead, in October 1848, Morrison wrote directly to President Polk: 
 
We the undersigned Catawba Indians…having been badly treated, cheated 
and defrauded…humbly beg His Excellency the President …to remove us 
west of the Miss. under an act of the late Congress.  With the hope His 
Excellency will grant our request we remain your most o.b.svts.44 
 
In response, William Medill, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, instructed the 
Chief of the Chickasaw Agency, A. Upshaw, to gauge the willingness of the 
Chickasaw to accept the Catawbas.  On January 8, 1849, Agent Upshaw 
responded that the Chickasaw chiefs were willing to accept the Catawbas 
providing that they receive the Catawba annuity payments.45 
 Seabrook’s successor John H. Means continued this effort with the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs.  In his First Legislative Message in November 1851, Means 
reported and strongly recommended, that funding “to grant them the means of 
emigrating to the West, with the view of settling near the Chickasaws.”46  This 
time it was the Chickasaw Council that voted it down.  This rebuff by the 
Chickasaw did not deter a few of the frustrated Catawbas from making another 
independent effort.  Aided by tireless agent Joseph White, twenty-three of them 
left South Carolina in December 1851, and those that survived the journey settled 
with the Choctaw in Arkansas.  In November 1853, the Choctaw Council 
admitted them as full citizens of the Choctaw Nation.47  After two hundred years 
of adopting other tribes on the brink of extinction, the Catawba were themselves 
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now the refugees.  Those new Choctaw citizens bore the familiar Catawba names 
of Morrison, Heart, Kegg, and Ayers.48   
 The Choctaws’ acceptance of this group enhanced the efforts of both the 
state and national governments to achieve a Choctaw solution over the latter half 
of the 1850s.49  South Carolina successfully involved the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, and the Catawba made their assent known.  The only stumbling block 
was finding a “congenial tribe” willing to accept them.  Despite all these efforts to 
reverse past policy, the Legislature in 1852 seemed ever determined to undermine 
even this plan.  Once again, the legislators refused to vote any monetary support, 
and in 1856 the South Carolina House called for yet another commission to 
explore union with the Choctaw Nation.  Instead of funding these promising 
relocation efforts, the Legislature claimed it owed even less. 50 
 By 1859, most Catawbas began to doubt the prospect of any Western plan.  
Yet another Governor, William H. Gist, again reminded the Legislature of South 
Carolina’s obligations.  Gist had personally visited the Indians and found them to 
be divided on the question of emigration.  He suggested an appropriation to allow 
some tribal leaders to visit the Choctaws and report back, with the hope of 
convincing the uncertain ones to relocate.51  The funds to explore this new option 
were allocated, and Chief Allen Harris and Headman John Harris journeyed to 
visit the Choctaw Nation in late 1859.  The negotiations proved mutually 
acceptable.  The Catawba leaders were warmly received, and most of the families 
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remaining agreed to move west.  The Choctaw appeared willing to accept the 
Catawba.52 
 In 1860, Governor Gist reported on the Harris’s journey of exploration. 
 
Harris was so pleased with the country, and the reception he met with, that 
he determined to remain, and has written such a flattering letter to his 
tribe…that forty-seven out of the fifty-five of the Indians living in the 
nation in this State, have agreed to remove.53 
 
But even this close to resolving the stalemate the question of South Carolina’s 
financial backing resurfaced.  Due to South Carolina’s inaction, Federal 
appropriations had lapsed and South Carolina needed to fund the move alone.  
Once again, no decision by South Carolina proved to be a decision as two outside 
events in 1859-1860 scuttled these plans.  The first was the death of Chief Allen 
Harris, the prime motivator and architect of the plan.  More significantly 
Secession now loomed large, as the Southern states sensed active Federal 
opposition after John Brown’s raid and the election of Lincoln.            
The Catawba people did not endure these antebellum struggles in 
isolation.  All the Indian tribes of the Southeast faced intense pressure to cede 
their lands in the new economic order.  But the Catawbas’ experience stands in 
sharp contrast—even uniqueness—when compared to that of their fellow 
Southeastern Indian neighbors.  The exile of the Five Civilized Tribes began in 
1830 with the Choctaws and ended with the Cherokee Trail of Tears in 1838-
1839, coincidental with our study period of the Catawbas.  These other 
Southeastern Indian peoples were pried out by the lever of Federal law and force.  
In significant contrast, the Catawbas, who wanted to emigrate, were stymied by 
South Carolina but also ignored by the Federal government.  How and why this 
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complete reversal of state and Federal roles operative for the other tribes occurred 
is a matter that is at the heart of this thesis.  There are no specific agreements or 
documentation that proclaimed this Federal policy reversal with the Catawbas.  
The explanation proposed here lies in the dynamics of the early national period.  
The right, even the obligation, of the Federal government to handle Indian affairs 
was established in the Constitution.  The third power granted to Congress under 
Article I, Section 8, included that of regulating commerce with the Indian tribes.  
Very early in Washington’s first term Congress and the Executive passed 
legislation to implement this prerogative.  “An Act to Regulate Trade and 
Intercourse with the Indians Tribes” was enacted on July 22, 1790.  It established 
the power of the new national government to negotiate Indian treaties.  Section 
Four of that “non-intercourse act” as it came to be known specified  
 
That no sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of 
Indians in the United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to 
any state, whether having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not, 
unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, 
held under the authority of the United States. 
 
Subsequent revisions of this Act clarified and expanded that sole authority and 
mechanism.  Clearly the states were to have no dealings with Indian tribes. 
 
The Supreme Court upheld this Federal control of Indian affairs in 1832 in 
Worcester v. Georgia.  Chief Justice John Marshall declared the opinion of the 
Court.  The Constitution 
 
confers on Congress the powers of war and peace, of making treaties, and 
of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
states, and with the Indian tribes.  These powers comprehend all that is 
required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indian tribes.  They 
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are not limited by any restrictions on their free actions; the shackles 
imposed on this power, in the confederation, are discarded.54 
 
This landmark decision was the basis for subsequent Indian land claims and other 
redress efforts down through the present day. 
 Undoubtedly what South Carolina did in the 1830s, culminating in the 
1840 Nations Ford Treaty, was unconstitutional.  But other concerns were 
operative during this period, primarily the sense of a humanitarian obligation to 
provide for the Indians.  The idea of relocation gained ever more consideration as 
assimilation and civilization efforts faltered.  According to historians Theda 
Perdue and Michael D. Green  
 
Clearly, however, the issue was more complicated than the lust for land.  
No state could demand all the land owned by Indians and ignore the 
question of what was to happen to them after they sold out.  By 1820 the 
popular ideology denied the possibility of “civilization” and assimilation 
(of the Indian peoples), the only logical alternative was expulsion.  No one 
seriously suggested the third possibility, extermination.  Expulsion, or 
removal as it came to be known, was an idea that dated back to 1803 when 
President Thomas Jefferson had contemplated the acquisition of 
Louisiana…with the notion that eastern Indians might exchange their 
lands for comparable tracts west of the Mississippi.55 
 
Indeed, Jefferson’s years as President marked a watershed shift in national Indian 
policy, when the attitudes, ideas, and mechanisms of Federal Indian policy were 
debated and retooled.  Anthony F.C. Wallace has thoroughly explored this in his 
study Jefferson and the Indians-The Tragic Fate of the First Americans. 
In the 1790s many prominent Americans, including Jefferson initially, 
favored a civilizing policy toward these aboriginal people.  Education, efforts to 
shift their livelihood from nomadic hunting to settled agriculture and “household 
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arts” production, and cultural assimilation would provide a better life, even 
survival for them within the new white order.  Jefferson’s first message to 
Congress in the spring of 1801 placed Indian affairs in a core position for his 
Presidency and emphasized these noble goals.  However, at the same time 
Jefferson called for white settlement of the vast, open lands “now vacant.”  They 
were vacant except for their Indian inhabitants.  The conflict inherent in these two 
ideas would prove the subject of much subsequent discussion and revision.56 
 Thus, in his first two years in office, Jefferson, guided by “civilizing” 
principles, moved to obtain Indian lands by treaty and voluntary emigration, 
particularly in the Southeast.  However, significant difficulties enforcing the 
“Trade and Intercourse” acts, the escalating westward migration and its demands 
for new settlement lands, and concerns about the surrounding presence of the 
British, French, and Spanish and the threats they posed for the fledgling nation, 
caused a rethinking of these early ideals.  Jefferson’s mature policy was 
elucidated in the first half of 1803, coinciding with the Louisiana Purchase.  This 
revised national Indian policy sought a peaceful coexistence with the Indians, 
increased trade (to make them dependent), and relocation.  The Louisiana 
Purchase lands were originally seen as the sole alternative to extinction for 
Indians rejecting white assimilation and “civilization.”  Relocation also evolved 
into the preferred method to accommodate the western migration and Manifest 
Destiny.57  Interestingly, Jefferson even drafted a proposal for a constitutional 
amendment to effect this plan.  All whites—and their slaves—would be removed 
from Louisiana to the East, and all Indians, in exchange for their Eastern lands, 
would have the trans-Mississippi to themselves.  Congress failed to act on his 
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proposed amendment, but Jefferson’s idea of Indian removal to Western lands 
became the centerpiece of Indian policy.58 
Removal as central to solving the “Indian problem” was expanded to new 
significance by Andrew Jackson.  Jackson had gained fame as an Indian fighter 
and negotiated many of the first treaties with the tribes.  He was elected in 1828 
with overwhelming Southern support, especially for his ideas on Indian expulsion.  
Jackson proposed removal in his first Inaugural Address in 1829 and discussed his 
ideas in every annual Message to Congress from 1829 through 1836.  No other 
issue was so consistently emphasized during his Presidency.  The Indian Removal 
Act of 1830, enacted very early in Jackson’s first term, became the final piece of 
the Federal Indian policy.   
 Our two-part question—why did South Carolina handle the Catawbas on 
its own, and why did the government in Washington allow that to happen?—
poses intriguing possibilities.  Multiple factors were operative in South Carolina’s 
treatment of the Catawbas being ignored in Washington.  They were an 
insignificant tribe of around sixty individuals.  Their land was entirely within 
South Carolina, and did not border any other state or Federally-held territory.  As 
such the Federal government had no direct cause to intervene.  Alternatively, the 
Federal failure to follow through on national Indian policy could have happened 
by default, and been a chance, random situation resulting from the circumstances 
of that time.  The principal reason, however, had to do with the evolving process 
of establishing national governmental authority over the former essentially 
independent colonies as they transitioned to statehood in a union. 
 This transition occurred in the late 1700s and early 1800s as the Articles 
of Confederation, which were found unworkable in practice, were superseded by 
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the Constitution.  Specifically, the Articles of Confederation were ambiguous with 
regards to whether the states or the national government were to control Indian 
affairs, and the resulting confusion caused a hybrid system of regulation.  Indian 
affairs thus became an early issue in the ensuing pivotal struggle over the exact 
delineation of state and Federal rights and obligations that characterized the 
antebellum period.  Two authors have studied this issue.  
The first is Timothy Vollman, an attorney with over thirty years of 
experience in American Indian law, who has represented both the Indian tribes 
and the Bureau of Indian affairs.  When contacted, he postulated on why South 
Carolina was allowed to negotiate a treaty with the Catawbas outside the Federal 
Constitution and law and suggested that the answer 
 
may lie in the language of the Articles of Confederation.  The Articles 
contain very confusing compromise language on the relative roles of the 
state and confederated governments in the area of Indian affairs.  One 
explanation for state treaty-making is that state officials may have labored 
under the presumption that the Indian Commerce Clause and Non-
intercourse Act did not change the law much from the 1780s when states 
were legitimately negotiating with tribes.59 
 
Vollman concludes with reference to the studies of Paul Prucha, who has 
examined the complex and changing relationship of the national government and 
the Indians in the formative years.  Prucha particularly cites the Articles of 
Confederation as the prime source of confusion over control of Indian affairs.  
John Marshall, in Worcester vs. Georgia emphasized that the shackles the Articles 
of Confederation imposed on this Federal control of Indian affairs, were thus 
discarded.  Prucha emphasizes that a careful reading of the Articles of 
Confederation shows the ambiguity that led to the confusion over state-tribal 
treaties.  The first paragraph of Article VI covering treaties, he notes, reads “No 
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State, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, 
shall…enter any conference, agreement alliance or treaty with any King, Prince or 
State.”  No mention is made of Indian treaties or even defines the political status 
of these peoples.  The final paragraph of Article VIII states, “The United States in 
Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power 
of…regulating all affairs with the Indians, not members of any States, provided 
that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or 
violated.”   The relative federal and state power over Indian treaties was thus 
unclear.  Further complicating this was Article II, which at the start declared that 
“each State retains…every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this 
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.” 
 When one examines the course of Indian affairs through the periods of the 
Articles of Confederation, the Constitution, and the first few decades of the 
1800s, it was the Southern states, especially South Carolina, that voiced the main 
resistance to acquiescing to the Federal control.  John Dickinson‘s draft of the 
Articles of Confederation in July 1776 included central regulation of trade and 
management of all Indian affairs.  This provision engendered strong debate, with 
a decided split among the states.  South Carolina adamantly wanted to manage its 
tribes internally, and that opposition led to the final compromise language as 
above.  This confusing phrasing in the Articles of Confederation led to most 
Southern states continuing to directly deal with their Indians, interpreting the 
Articles in their own interests.60 
 Thus, the principle of Federal control existed but was seriously clouded by 
the issue of states’ rights.  This ambiguity led to uncertainty about who had the 
power to manage Indian matters, and Congress had to continually reassert its 
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dominance on this issue.  James Madison characterized the resulting confusion 
about Indian management under the Article of Confederation as obscure, 
contradictory and incomprehensible in The Federalist when he was urging 
adoption of the more definitive Constitution.  The final, unanimous wording of 
that blueprint stated that the Federal government had the power of war and peace, 
treaties, and to regulate trade and commerce, including foreign nations, among the 
states “and with the Indian tribes.”  In Prucha’s view these five words proved 
significant. 
 
These five words would seem to be scant foundation upon which to build 
the structure of Federal legislation regulating trade and intercourse with 
the Indians.  Yet through them, plus the treaty making and other powers, 
Congress has ever since exercised what amounts plenary power over 
Indian tribes.61 
 
That phrase was the basis of John Marshall’s decision in Worcester vs. Georgia.  
Marshall held that the powers granted by the Constitution in those words 
comprehend all that is required for the regulation of intercourse with the Indians.   
The Federal government asserted this Constitutional prerogative in the Non-
intercourse Acts, the Indian removal legislation, and with military actions and 
treaties to secure control of Indian affairs.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
1860-1866—THE CIVIL WAR EXPERIENCE OF THE CATAWBA PEOPLE 
 
Within weeks of secession, the Catawbas volunteered to serve in the South 
Carolina Militia, and their offer of military assistance was gratefully accepted.  
This development was noted by The New York Times in an editorial published on 
January 26, 1861, which couldn’t resist ridiculing the Catawbas’ action.  Under 
the heading “Whoop!” they derided the military ability—and even the 
commitment—of the Catawbas to this or any cause.  But before Northerners 
panicked, especially “little old ladies” who had heard tales from their grandfathers 
of the Catawbas’ fierce fighting in the Revolutionary War, the paper assured its 
readers that these were not the same Catawbas of their grandfather’s day and they 
posed no danger: 
 
…perhaps they gloomily thought of the terrible scenes that might again be 
enacted when myriads of scowling Catawbas should bend their bows 
against New York, or sharpen their tomahawks on the steps of St. 
Nicholas.  We beg to reassure the dear old ladies.  For, according to the 
last census, there was a grand total of but 200 Catawbas-men, women, and 
papooses in the whole empire of South Carolina; and, according to the 
accounts whilom given of these by Carolina authorities, no very great 
dangers need to be anticipated from their incursions at present.62 
 
 The “accounts whilom63 given...by Carolina authorities” were taken from 
a study in 1826 by Mills in his “Statistics of South Carolina.”  The New York 
Times editorial used the following passage from Mills’ report to prove its point, 
noting that the Catawbas were  
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so addicted to the habits of indolence and intoxication that they are fast 
sinking into oblivion.  (Despite rents of $20 per annum from white settlers 
on each 300 acres of their vast lands) these wretched Indians live in abject 
poverty in consequence of their dissipated habits.  They dun for their rent 
before it is due. (editor’s italics) Any money received is squandered, and 
they suffer for the remainder of the year in miserable poverty as beggars. 
 
To further support its sarcastic editorial, the newspaper repeated, unchanged, the 
description Mills had made of the Catawbas thirty-five years earlier:   
 
The annual income from this source must be at least $5000, which, if 
prudently managed, would soon place the Indians in a state of comfort; for 
the whole number of families does not exceed 30, or about 110 
individuals.  These wretched Indians, though they live in the midst of an 
industrious people and in an improved state of society, will be Indians 
still. Let Gov. Pickens take into solemn consideration that sentence of 
Mills which we have italicize, before he finally decides to enroll the 
Catawbas in the grand army of South Carolina; for, with an empty treasury 
and no pawnshops, what would he do with himself, should these dusty 
warriors, true to their historic reputation dun him for their pay before it is 
due?64 
 
 “Will be Indians still.”  Those were Mill’s original words.  Significantly, 
whites in the North and the South shared preconceived ideas and prejudices about 
the Indian.  What is interesting is the blind acceptance by the editorial writer of 
what Mills had written thirty-five years previously, along with his statement that 
the Catawbas hadn’t collected any rent in a generation.  Both sides in the new 
conflict betrayed the same facile assumptions about the Indian as indolent and 
drunken.  The repetition of this stereotype is curious in this instance.  One can 
understand the editor’s desire to reassure his readers by minimizing the South’s 
military threat, but the disparaging of the Catawbas is suggestive of the pervasive 
view, in both the North and South, that whites were better and more deserving of 
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the land and even had an obligation to make the land productive and halt the 
Indians’ abuses. 
 Such a mindset was, of course, not unique to this place or time.  In 1896 
H. Lewis Scaife, a college professor at Trinity Hall in Louisville, Kentucky wrote 
a monograph entitled “The History and Condition of the Catawba Indians of 
South Carolina.”  He also shows this pervasive impression of the Indian even in 
educated men, but then relates his own experience with the Catawbas to claim that 
they were an exception to the stereotype.  After discussing Mills’ article, Scaife 
quoted Theodore Roosevelt, who after serving as Federal Civil Service 
Commissioner during which he had toured reservations in the West, remarked: 
 
The one thing to be impressed upon the average Indian is that…above all 
he must work, just as a white man does.  One of the most pernicious things 
that can be done is to pet too much the Indians.65 
 
Like Scaife, Roosevelt was an educated man and someone who had experience of 
the Indians of the Northeast and West.  Drawing from his own experience with 
the Catawba people, Scaife observed how little the Catawbas fit Roosevelt’s 
description: 
 
Mr. Roosevelt probably knows as much about the Indian character as any 
man in America, and this observation is, no doubt, well founded.  But as 
far as the Catawba Indians are concerned it does not apply…indeed, the 
Catawba present an exception to the Indian character… 
 
The Catawba Indians have never been “petted;” they always have been 
and still are mistreated and neglected.  As to their condition, the writer 
knows whereof he speaks, as he has often visited the tribe and has had 
ample opportunity to study their condition.66 
 
Sacife, however, was exceptional in his view that Indians were not necessarily 
lazy and dissolute. 
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 What was the experience of the Catawba people in this all-consuming 
conflict that was the American Civil War?  Like their fellow Confederate citizens, 
the war significantly affected both the soldiers and those on the home front.  We 
will first examine the military experience, and then the civilian response, 
emphasizing in both the similarity of both to what all Southerners caught up in the 
Civil War endured.  The Catawbas’ experience serves as a microcosm of the 
shared Confederate sacrifice and suffering.  Indeed, this idea of universality 
extends to Union combatants and citizens, even to those caught in all warfare.  
Our second effort will focus on the central mystery of why the Catawbas 
supported the Confederate war effort at all, considering their treatment prior to 
1861 by South Carolina detailed in the prologue.  With this second examination 
we move sharply from shared experience to a unique dynamic only the Catawbas 
faced. 
 Two new historiographical emphases are made in this chapter.  First, since 
these Indian soldiers did not record their battle and war experiences, we have had 
to rely on the memoirs of two white Confederate soldiers from South Carolina 
who fought alongside the Catawbas.  These were Edward McCrady, an officer in 
the 1st SC Volunteers, who fought that day with the 12th SC (Gregg’s Brigade), 
and recorded the action faced by both units at Second Manassas,67 and F.W. 
McMaster, in the SC 17th Volunteers (Brig. General Stephen Elliott Jr.’s Brigade) 
who gives his eye-witness account of the Battle of the Crater at Petersburg.68  
Regarding the Catawba home front, it has not been explored at all; with the 
exception of Thomas Blumer’s inclusion in is work of Catawba agent John R. 
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Patton’s 1864 Report.69  There Blumer explores the life of the Catawbas left at 
home. 
 Following the initial victories at Fort Sumter and then First Manassas 
there was a rush throughout the Confederacy to join the cause.  The Catawba 
warriors were no different.  The first enlistments were on December 9, 1861, 
when four Catawbas entered the CSA at Charleston’s Camp Hampton.  Jefferson 
Ayers, William Canty, John Scott, and Alexander Timms joined Company K, 17th 
South Carolina Volunteers (later Infantry).  Less than two weeks later the brothers 
James and John Harris enlisted with Company H, 12th South Carolina Infantry.  
Over the next four years almost all of the Catawbas able for military duty joined 
in small groups, serving in the three South Carolina Infantry Regiments:  the 5th, 
Company G; the 12th , Company H; and the 17th, Company K.  By volunteering in 
small groups of friends and siblings, the Catawbas reflected the recruitment 
pattern throughout the Confederate States Army.  Soldiers joined in personal 
groupings, usually from the same town, same family or some other bond that 
personally connected them to each other.70 
 The exact number of Catawba Confederate soldiers remains disputed, and 
it will probably never be known due to incomplete or lost records.  Estimates 
range between seventeen and twenty Catawba men who volunteered.  Thomas J. 
Blumer, who lists eighteen, observed that this was the entire male population 
capable of fighting.71  For Blumer the exact number is unimportant.  His emphasis 
is on the complete embrace and the costly sacrifice of the Catawbas in the Civil 
War of the Confederate cause. 
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 When John Harris enlisted early in the war, he had just returned from his 
journey to the Choctaw Nation, where he and Chief Allen Harris had negotiated a 
new homeland for the Catawbas.  John Harris immediately had begun to recruit 
his people and work with South Carolina authorities to fulfill these aspirations 
when the war abruptly cut short their plans and hopes.  The initial Confederate 
euphoria and patriotic fervor were soon replaced by the reality of war, as the 
number of combat wounds and deaths mounted.  John and Peter Harris were both 
wounded at Antietam, where the South Carolina 12th played a crucial role.  Their 
wounds were noted in the October 8, 1862, edition the local York County 
newspaper, the Yorkville Enquirer, which published “A list of killed and wounded 
in the Battle of September 17, 1862, in Maryland,” listing as casualties from 
Company H “John Harris (Indian) severely in the leg; James Harris (Indian) 
slightly in the foot.”  The Harris brothers were among the one hundred and two 
soldier causalities from the 12th Regiment.72  Both were serving as cooks for 
Company H at the start of September 1862, but with the ever-changing action of 
battle, were forced into being combatants.  John Harris had suffered a near-fatal 
wound in his left leg and pleaded with his fellow soldiers to shoot him to prevent 
capture.  He was taken as a prisoner of war, one of the thousands of soldiers 
captured during the Civil War.73  John Harris was more fortunate than many other 
POWs.  He received treatment at Union hospitals in Frederick, Maryland, and 
recovered sufficiently to be exchanged in May 1863.  Eventually he returned to 
duty, but the wound persisted and he remained crippled for the rest of his life.74  
In spite of this, John Harris served as Catawba Chief from 1869 through 1871.  
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Thus, he was one of numerous disabled war veterans who served with distinction 
in later civilian life. 
 John Harris’s brother, James, was also wounded at Antietam but less 
severely, and returned to duty in early 1863.  He fought at Gettysburg, and he saw 
combat action at The Wilderness and Spotsylvania the following year.  James 
Harris survived to witness Lee’s surrender at Appomattox in April 1865.75  Like 
his brother John, he returned to the Catawba reservation and lived another 
nineteen years to the age of forty.76 
 Two other Catawba Confederate volunteers spent the duration of the war 
in prison camps.  Peter Harris also was wounded at Antietam and then recovered 
at Confederate Hospitals in Williamsburg and Farmville, Virginia.  Subsequently 
he served in the Petersburg trenches in defense of Richmond, where he was 
captured by Union forces on April 2, 1865.  He was sent to Hart’s Island in New 
York City harbor and was not paroled until June 16, 1865.77  Likewise, Nelson 
George was taken prisoner, most likely at the Battle of Reams Station and spent 
the duration of the war in a POW camp until he was released at Charlotte, North 
Carolina on May 16, 1865.   
 At least three Catawbas were directly killed in action.  Blumer notes these 
soldiers have no extant service records, but tradition identifies Franklyn Canty 
and family members John and William Sanders as also having died.78  Disease, 
like combat, was a significant cause of death and disability for Civil War soldiers.  
The service records of Catawba volunteers bear this out.  William Canty fought at 
Second Manassas, Boonsboro, and then at Antietam without wound or injury.  It 
was disease, not warfare, that sidelined him.  Stricken at camp in Culpeper, 
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Virginia, Canty was hospitalized at Richmond, suffering with a jaundice that was 
probably secondary to hepatitis.  Troops who had never been outside their home 
area were fodder for the numerous viral and bacterial infections that ravaged war 
camps.  Canty recovered sufficiently enough to be discharged home at the end of 
his enlistment on February 3, 1863.79 
 Fellow Catawba Robert Mush’s service record lists no battle engagements 
or wounds, only disease.  He enlisted in 1863 and his service record lists only 
furloughs home to recover from illnesses.  By June of 1864, Mush was 
hospitalized in Williamsburg, Virginia, with chronic diarrhea, most likely from 
the rampant strains of dysentery.  Unable to do anything for him, Mush was 
furloughed home again, where he died shortly thereafter.80 
 William Canty reenlisted on March 11, 1864, this time with a different 
unit.  From May to June 1864 Canty saw action resisting Grant’s offensive at The 
Wilderness, at Spotsylvania, and finally at Petersburg.  His service record ends 
abruptly on July 7, 1864.81  He was never heard from again, and there is no 
official notice of his fate, although Catawba tradition has long held that he died in 
combat at Petersburg.82 
 After enlisting together in 1862, Robert Crawford and Robert Head both 
shared the fate of the thousands of Confederate soldiers who were lost in action 
and presumed dead.  Robert Crawford’s service is largely unknown.  He 
disappeared after December 31, 1862, in the vicinity of Fredericksburg following 
the battle there, and was most likely killed in action.83  Robert Head was 
furloughed home in 1863 to recover after hospitalization for “chronic diarrhea.”  
He returned, but an undated notation lists him as “among the Officers and soldiers 
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of the Army of the Confederate States who were killed in action or who died of 
wounds or disease.”84 
 The Confederate service of Catawba Jefferson Ayers is particularly 
poignant.  He endured battlefield wounds on at least two separate occasions, 
suffered from disease, was captured, and died of complications of his wounds and 
disease as a POW.  After enlisting with the first group of Catawba volunteers in 
1861, Jefferson Ayers was wounded at Boonsboro on September 14, 1862, just 
prior to Antietam.  After recovering at home, Ayers served in the Petersburg 
trenches and then suffered a gunshot wound to his head at Hatchers Run during 
Lee’s April 1865 retreat.  Straggling behind, he was captured and imprisoned at 
the USA Hospital, Point Lookout, Maryland.  While there he was initially treated 
for his head wound, but soon the additional diagnosis of chronic diarrhea 
ominously appeared on his chart.  Either would have been serious, but together 
these conditions proved fatal.  Jefferson Ayers died on July 2, 1865.  He had 
served four years of warfare, only to die from his wounds and complicating 
disease after the war was over.  Many other soldiers died months and years after 
April 1865 of disease and wounds they contracted during the war.  Like countless 
other Civil War soldiers, he was buried a long way from his home and family.85 
 Jefferson Ayers’ Civil War record also contains insights into other aspects 
of a Confederate soldier’s life.  On October 3, 1862, Ayers affixed his mark at 
Richmond to notary Edward Scott’s printed form.  In doing so he declared that he 
had not been paid the $119 due him for serving since joining in December of 
1861.  Only his name, unit, date, mark and Scott’s signature were filled in, 
indicative of a large number of similar affidavits to require a printed form.  Filing 
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this legal action was the action necessary to be paid.86  In a similar pay issue, both 
Nelson George and William Canty were never paid the promised enlistment 
bounty.87   
 Undocumented stories of personal valor, exploits and sacrifice are 
common to all wars, and the combatants of the Civil War, including the 
Catawbas, are not exceptions.  Ann Evans has indicated that there was an 
additional Catawba veteran, James Patterson, who was only twelve when he 
served.  Patterson survived the war.88  Douglas Summer Brown includes a 
Catawba named Billy George, who was probably the brother of Nelson George.  
Although his military career is likewise shrouded in uncertainty, he is thought to 
have been wounded at Gettysburg and subsequently killed at the siege of 
Petersburg.  However, stories survive in traditional tribal lore that he returned 
home after the war.89  The only surviving artifact of the Catawbas’ actual 
Confederate service is a grainy, faded photograph of Robert Head that supposedly 
was taken in Rock Hill when he was absent without leave, having left to see his 
newborn son.  
 The unselfish service of these Catawba Confederate soldiers was first 
noted by Catawba Agent and advocate John R. Patton.  In November 1864, he 
wrote of their grim sacrifice: 
 
All of the males Except 3 is now or have been in the Service of the 
Confederate States Five of whom have died in the Service, one or Two 
Discharged from Physical Disability.  Two or three have been Severely 
Wounded and one of them a cripple for Life.90 
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 The overall significance of the Catawbas’ war record is expressed by 
Laurence Hauptman: 
 
The Catawba were the most committed of all Indian groups that sided with 
the Confederacy.  Although the number of Catawbas in gray was not large, 
it represented fully one-third of their population-at least 19 men from a 
total of 60 people.  This dedication stemmed from the Catawbas’ 
perception of themselves as Southerners as well as Indians, even though 
contact with white men obviously had decimated them.  They went off to 
fight as “good neighbors,” having volunteered their services to South 
Carolina even before the war began.  And although they would be exposed 
to the worst of war and practically destroyed, the Catawbas would remain 
loyal to the end.91 
 
 If the Catawbas thought of themselves as good neighbors and wanted to 
help the white cause, they also knew that they were not white themselves, nor that 
they were like the other Southerners that volunteered.   
 No surviving war records specifically mention battle action by the 
Catawba, and of course they never left records of their own.  But the two 
regiments in which they primarily served—the 17th and the 12th South Carolina 
Infantries—were engaged at many of the war’s significant conflicts.  Three of 
these were Second Manassas, Antietam, and Petersburg, and we have eyewitness 
collaboration of the actions of these two units.  This testimony is presented in an 
effort to glimpse what the Catawbas experienced and endured. 
 Company H, 12th South Carolina Infantry was commanded by Captain 
Cadwalader Jones and included men from the Rock Hill area.  They were attached 
to General David Maxcy Gregg’s Second Brigade, 1st Corps of the Army of 
Northern Virginia.  At Second Manassas on August 29, 1862, they found 
themselves in the middle of the action.  Around ten on that morning, despite 
Jackson’s order not to engage the enemy, Gregg advanced his Brigade and 
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effectively broke through at the center of the Union line.  Thereupon Union 
General John Pope sent troops under Kearney to repulse this incursion.  Jones 
himself describes the response of his men. 
 
Wheeling these companies again into line, the Twelfth charged in the most 
gallant manner, firing as it advanced, and putting the enemy completely to 
rout, pursued them with heavy slaughter through the woods and until they 
crossed the field and ran out of sight…Very soon fresh column of the 
enemy, probably three regiments, were seen advancing.  Just at this time 
the First Rifles, most opportunely, were also seen advancing through the 
woods to our support.  Forming a line with and on the left of this regiment, 
together we gave them battle, and without much difficulty or loss again 
drove back the enemy.92 
 
 Two weeks later at Antietam, the 12th was part of A.P. Hill’s Light 
Division, which had just help captured Harper’s Ferry and then hurried north.  
Gregg’s Brigade arrived around four in the afternoon, providing a critical 
counterattack as Union forces threatened to break the Confederate right flank.  
The 12th was deployed just north of the Burnside Bridge.  Hiding behind a stone 
wall they inflicted heavy losses directly on the 16th. Connecticut Volunteer 
Infantry.  Suffering more than three hundred casualties in a matter of minutes, the 
Federal troops were forced to retreat.93  It was in this engagement that James and 
John Harris, the two Catawbas serving in the 12that that time, were wounded. 
 There is other evidence of the Catawbas’ battlefield experience.  The 
January-February 1885 issue of the Southern Historical Society Papers published 
an address by Lieutenant-Colonel Edward McCrady, Jr. McCrady’s speech was 
given at Walhalla, South Carolina for a meeting of the survivors of the 12th 
Regiment. In this speech he quotes Robert E. Lee concerning Second Manassas: 
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 General Lee in his report after mentioning a threat made on Longstreet 
says: 
 
… a large force advanced to assail the left of Jackson’s position, occupied 
by the division of General A.P. Hill. The attack was received by his troops 
with their accustomed steadiness, and the battle raged with great fury.  The 
enemy was repeatedly repulsed, but again pressed on the attack with fresh 
troops…General Gregg, who was most exposed, and successfully and 
gallantly resisted the attack of the enemy until the ammunition of his 
brigade being exhausted, and all its field officers but two killed or 
wounded, it was relieved, after several hours of severe fighting.94 
 
 Catawba troops were also present at the Battle of the Crater in 1864.  At 
4:44 AM on July 30, 1864, miners serving in the 48th Pennsylvania Infantry at 
Petersburg exploded a gaping wound, measuring 170 feet long, 60 feet wide and 
30 feet deep, in the Confederate defensive works at Petersburg.  Defending this 
section was the 17th South Carolina Infantry, Brigadier General Stephen Elliott’s 
Brigade, which included several Catawbas.  This was the second Union effort in 
what would be six attempts to breach the defenses, and the Catawbas 
participated—and paid dearly—in helping counter each of these assaults between 
July 1864 and April 1865.  But the Battle of the Crater would become for “The 
Indians fighting for the North and South …their bloodiest face-to-face meeting.”95   
 The subject of Catawba home front conditions during the Civil War has 
been largely ignored by Catawba historians.  Only Thomas Blumer, quoting 
Catawba Agent John Patton, makes any reference to those left behind.  This is 
striking in view of the attention that has been paid recently in Civil War studies to 
conditions on the home front.  An example is Virginia’s Private War:  Feeding 
Body and Soul in the Confederacy, William Blair’s recounting of the home 
conditions in Civil War Virginia.  In contrast, since the Catawba Nation had 
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become obscure and insignificant, their domestic story is a mere footnote, 
evidently not worthy of a detailed study.  There was only one literate and 
concerned witness to this aspect of the Civil War for the Catawbas.  Fortunately, 
we are left with accurate descriptions of the Catawbas at home in Agent Patton’s 
annual reports. 
 In January 1861, the South Carolina House resolved that only those 
Catawbas actually living on the Old Reservation were to receive any portion of 
that year’s support.  By the fall of that year the hardship in the Nation, in large 
part resulting from the war service of their prime men, had become serious.  In 
November a full forty white citizens of York County petitioned the Assembly, 
asking for aid to the Catawbas at home: 
 
That a number of the Catawba Indians, resident in this District, have not 
shared any portion of the last appropriation made in their behalf, by reason 
of their being non-residents of their Nation proper…we regard them as 
possessing equal virtue and consideration…and entitled to like bounty at 
your hands.96 
 
It is unclear whether the whites of York County were totally altruistic here, or 
whether self-interest was involved, since more state aid would require less help on 
their part. 
 Also in November 1861, the newly-appointed Catawba Agent, J. R. 
Patton, submitted his first Annual Report to the South Carolina Senate and House 
of Representatives.  He describes them as generally 
 
very well satisfied with their present condition.  They are a somewhat 
indolent and careless people living in small Log Houses…scattered over a 
considerable portion of the land they occupy…as a general thing they do 
not make anything like a support. 
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I would further say that there is still some accounts yet-unsettled in 
consequence of the holders being absent in the Army.  There is also a 
portion of the Indians which have not Rec’d their full amounts.97 
 
This is the first record of wretched conditions endured by the Catawbas at home at 
very the start of the Civil War, and of the early, significant impact of having their 
men away in service. 
 Just a year later, when Patton submitted his second Annual Report, he 
indicated that the home situation and conditions had deteriorated markedly in only 
one year of war.  Patton wrote: 
 
Many of whom are at this time in very destitute circumstances a few of 
them are quite old & unable to do much for themselves.  An other (sic) 
portion are in great want in consequence of their Husbands being absent in 
the Army nearly or quite all of them has children to support.  There is 
fifteen males fit for military duty Eleven of whom are now in the Service 
of the Confederate States.  Several of them have been wounded in the late 
Battles near Sharpsburg.  I would simply say to Your Honourable Body 
that I visited the Tribe a few days since for the purpose of inquiring into 
there condition.  I asked many of them if they got plenty to eat.  They 
Frankly told me they did not, that they were not able…often…to procure 
bread.98 
 
 In 1863, Patton emphasized the dire poverty of the Catawba at home, and 
the continuous worsening food situation for them.  Some, he noted, tend small 
gardens and have a cow or some hogs, but 
 
many of them have none of either.  There (sic) little farms are decidedly 
worse managed this year than they have ever been since I have been acting 
as agent for them.  Perhaps for the simple reason that nearly All the Males 
are in the service of the Confederate States.  The Tribe will be greatly 
dependent upon the charities of the State or upon the charities of the 
communities around where they live as many of them are making no 
support whatever.99 
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 Apparently the citizens of the York District did come to the assistance of 
their Catawba neighbors at this time, and it appears that Agent John R. Patton’s 
personal attention was instrumental in assisting the Tribe.  When Patton was 
summoned to military service in 1863, both the white citizens and the Indians 
petitioned Governor Banham to exempt him from service to continue his work.  
The York community had interceded for the Catawba two years previously.  Now 
the Catawbas joined their neighbors in petitioning for help.  The only previous 
Catawba entreaty to any government body was to the Federal Government twenty 
years before to help them in relocating to the West. 
 On October 10, 1863, sixteen Catawbas pleaded their case for Patton to 
stay. 
 
Owing to the necessities of our people, and the scarcity of provisions, it is 
necessary to have the Agent near to us…and owing to a turbulent spirit 
which prevails among many of our people, the presence of our Agent is 
necessary.100  
 
In an accompanying petition the York residents declare they know the situation of 
the Indians and confirm that the conditions stated in their petition are true. 
 
The attachment of the Indians to him (Patton) is such as to give him entire 
influence over them, not only to govern their supplies, but to keep down 
any difficulties which may arise.101 
 
 Patton himself wrote directly to Governor Banhom stating that he had 
been exempted by the Governor and Council from military service as the bonded 
agent for the Catawba.  Despite this, he had been called into service, and he now 
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asked the Governor to intercede “for the purpose of attending to the wants of the 
Tribe.”102 
 Patton’s Civil War records show that he enlisted in Company K of the 5th 
South Carolina State Troops at Ebenezer, on August 1, 1863, but had been 
furloughed by order of Gen. Beauregard until the end of the year.  Although 
Patton did report on January 13, 1864, he was furloughed home one week later.  
Apparently the pleas to Governor Banhom proved effective.103 
 On January 6, 1864, the Yorkville Enquirer had as its lead story a report of 
a measure recently passed by the Legislature.  This concerned the Soldiers’ 
Boards of Relief; it read: 
 
The Soldiers’ Boards of Relief …are hereby notified that, under the 
requirements of the Act of December 17, 1863, entitled “An Act to make 
provisions for the support of the families of soldiers from this State in the 
Confederate and State services,” the amount appropriated by said Act has 
been apportioned upon the basis of the white population, shown by the 
census of 1859.104 
 
The plight of those at home struggling with the war depravations had been 
recognized, even if very late.  However, no mention is made of inclusion of the 
Catawbas in this assistance.  But Patton’s late 1864 summary captures the 
Catawba home front situation at the end of the war.  Most likely because of the 
chaos after April, no Indian Agent report was submitted in 1865.  
 
There has been a great deal of Sickness in the Nation during the present 
year and several have died.  I am at present unable to report any change in 
the condition of the Tribe for the better…as a matter of course, many of 
them are at Times considerably Straightened to get food enough to Satisfy 
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the Natural Cravings of hunger…There is but very few who have made 
anything in the way of provisions.105 
 
 Given such conditions, one wonders why the Catawbas, after nearly two 
centuries of economic deprivation, mistreatment, and fraud by the whites, 
continued their support of the white government by fighting for the Confederacy.  
This is a crucial question, not only because of their earlier mistreatment, but 
because they had no obligation to do so.  The difficulty of answering that question 
is complicated because the Catawba were a non-literate society at this time, and 
no self-written record of their actions and aspirations, their hopes and fears, is 
available.  There is, however, their oral tradition, which carried the Catawbas’ 
experience and history from generation to generation.  
 Why, then, did the Catawbas so completely embrace the Confederate 
cause?  Hauptman summarizes four significant reasons why the Catawba, as a 
sovereign nation with no obligation to fight, joined the Confederate war effort:  1) 
the enlistment bounty and regular soldiers’ pay; 2) their warrior and military 
tradition; 3) intimidation by white neighbors; and 4) most significantly, their 
economic and psychological dependence and identity with the white power 
structure of South Carolina.106  Historians have expressed differing views as to the 
significance of each of these possible explanations. 
 The Confederacy paid up to fifty dollars as an enlistment bonus.  Coupled 
with the security of regular pay, this was a significant draw for the impoverished 
Catawbas trying to live by subsistence farming and hunting on a mere 630 acres.  
Assistance from the state was minimal.  Agent Patton’s annual report for 1861 
shows that a total of $888.61 had been expended on supplies and services, or 
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about ten dollars a year for each tribe member.  Military bonuses and pay would 
have been critical to the Indians.107   
 The Catawba had been a warrior people throughout their existence.  Much 
of their personal and tribal self-identity derived from this focus.  As we have seen 
from Washington’s experience, they had a well-earned reputation as fierce and 
loyal combatants.  From the beginnings of the Carolina Colony in the 1670s, they 
had allied themselves with the white settlers. The first significant threat to 
Carolina came in 1670 from another local tribe. 
 
Efforts to keep the Westo out of the colony reached the state of open 
warfare.  The friendly Catawba had been approached in this first war of 
any consequence in which the colony was engaged.  They would be 
approached again and again as the settlers took root and the nation took 
form.108 
 
The only exception to white loyalty occurred in 1715, when the Catawbas joined 
the Yamasee War against the colonists over trade and land grievances. 
In addition to this alliance with South Carolina, the Nation had a longer 
history of conflict with other tribes.  The height of their military power was in the 
first half of the 18th century, when they waged almost unrelenting war against 
their primary rivals, the powerful Iroquois and Cherokee.  These conflicts 
continued in the French and Indian War, known as the Cherokee War to the 
Catawba, and during the Revolution, when the Catawba continued the bitter feud 
with the Iroquois.  A strong military consciousness and tradition was central to the 
Catawbas. 
The third possible factor, white coercion, is controversial.  Douglas 
Summers Brown suggests that this was a significant motivation for the Catawba.  
She notes that Frank Speck, a cultural anthropologist at the University of 
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Pennsylvania who studied the Catawbas extensively from 1913 through 1950, 
reported that several tribal members had related to him that they had been 
threatened with death if they failed to enlist.109  Hauptman, however, faults this 
explanation: 
 
Although South Carolina-Catawba relations were often tense and the state 
frequently attempted to remove the Indians, the explanation given to 
Speck appears to be a concocted postwar rationale for Catawba 
involvement in the Civil War.  The Catawba had an outstanding military 
record, one that can’t simply be rationalized by “impressment” into the 
South’s military service.110  
 
Blumer also argues that the Catawba enlistments were in five separate small 
enlistment groups spaced over three and one half years, which does not seem to 
suggest a pattern of coercion.  However, in talking with present-day tribal 
members this subject brings a smile of doubt.  There remains a deeply held 
tradition that perceived threats were at least a motivating factor in the enlistments.   
 Perhaps the fourth possible explanation, the interconnection and 
interaction with both white and black South Carolina, has the most significance in 
providing insight into the Catawba situation.  Hudson’s examination of the 
declining status of the Catawba in the pluralistic Southern plantation society 
captures their plight as the Civil War approached.  That society was increasingly 
polarized between white and black, with the Catawba and other Indians caught in 
the middle.  Hudson’s “obscure enclave” of Catawbas was thus confronted with 
an identity crisis:  “They faced a dilemma: were they to be a race or a nation?”111  
No longer a Nation, when forced to choose which of the two races in biracial 
South Carolina they were to be identified with, they chose the white one.   
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 The great other in that social network were the blacks, and by identifying 
with the white power faction, the Catawba both saw and positioned themselves as 
distinct from the slaves or freedmen.  What had started in colonial times as 
economic dependency had now evolved to include psychological dependence on 
South Carolina as well.  Hauptman credits this identity and dependence on South 
Carolina as the cause of the Catawbas’ support of the Confederacy: 
 
In this respect, they had much in common with poor Confederate recruits, 
who owned no slaves but nevertheless identified with the “Stars and 
Bars.”  The Catawba could not match the power of the planter class.  
Although they were considered to be on a lower plain in the social 
hierarchy of the South than their poor white neighbors, both groups saw 
themselves as distinct, more powerful, and superior to local blacks, slave 
or free.  As “good neighbors,” each deferred to the leadership of the 
planter class, their so-called “betters” on whom they were dependent.112 
 
 Being “good neighbors,” or “casting their lot with the home state as they 
had (always) done”113 as Blumer describes it, is different than the idea that in this 
war they were now trying to keep their identity as a distinct race.  Their physical 
survival had been threatened for generations, but now their existence as a people 
was precarious: in the period before the Civil War they were losing their separate 
Indian identity and becoming people of color.  This thesis argues that the specific 
root cause for this unqualified support was the Catawbas’ identity with white 
South Carolina, since this preserved their status as a distinct race, which now was 
in great peril.  Survival for the Catawbas after 1800 meant it was necessary to 
show identity with the white majority that supported them, and therefore to 
separate themselves from the black slaves and freedmen.  The ultimate support 
would be sacrificing their lives to sustain the Confederacy’s avowed racial views.  
They weren’t white, but they were not black either, and had a different 
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relationship with the dominant race of South Carolina.  The Catawbas’ continued 
existence as a distinct people depended on this specific psychological identity and 
dependence on white South Carolina.  Further examination of the Catawbas’ 
changing relationship with the blacks, and their eventual embrace of Christianity, 
are both significant factors that lend support for this thesis.    
The Catawbas’ complex relationship with blacks dated back two centuries.  
Tribal members were the third, and definitely the minor, race in a predominately 
biracial society.  The Catawbas’ viewpoint was also conditioned by their 
interaction with both the concept and the actual institution of slavery itself.  In 
colonial times the Catawba served as slave hunters, tracking, capturing, and 
returning runaway slaves for bounty.  As such they controlled the slaves, even if 
temporarily, and unlike the slaves, they had bargaining power with the whites.  
Significantly, even then, more than one hundred years before John Brown, 
Carolinians feared slave uprisings aided by outside help, especially a combined 
slave-Indian insurrection. 
 
Making a plantation colony in a frontier setting, the Carolinians feared that 
their African slaves might combine with defiant Indians to merge slave 
rebellion with frontier war-a combination almost certainly fatal to the new 
Colony.  The colony needed, at a minimum, to keep the Africans and the 
Indians apart.  Ultimately, the colonists hoped to pit the Africans against 
the Indians, the better to exploit both.114 
 
 The Catawbas also had the experience of being slaves themselves, 
captured and carried into servitude by other tribes.  Indian warfare had for 
centuries involved taking prisoners who were forced into slavery by their captors.  
However, some tribes, including both the Iroquois and Catawba, had a different 
need for captives.  As the result of their prolonged conflict, large losses of young 
warriors were sustained on both sides.  A few captives became not slaves but 
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replacement tribal members, being adopted into the captor Indian society to 
replace those tribal members lost.  Often raids were made with this express goal 
and were known as mourning wars.  The Catawba before 1800 had both Indian 
slaves and mourning adoptees. 
 In the French and Indian War, the Catawba saw first-hand their British 
allies giving supportive whites and Indians captured Cherokee warriors to be used 
as slaves.  This graphic experience of seeing Indians used as slaves was not lost 
on the Catawba.  They had seen it earlier too, when white traders sometimes took 
Indians to be sold as slaves.  Distancing and distinguishing themselves from the 
black slaves became paramount.  The Catawbas’ increasing diminution in the 
biracial society of South Carolina after 1800 was the major factor fueling their 
changed views on blacks.  The Catawba found themselves both isolated from their 
fellow Indians and dismissed by the white majority.  They faced the ever-growing 
specter of being considered on the same level as slaves.  Perhaps most 
significantly we have the words of the people themselves at this juncture in their 
struggle. “We have no home…” the Catawbas said in a petition to the South 
Carolina Legislature in 1844, “we feel lost without a home.”115 
 With Secession, the Choctaw plan and any hopes of the Catawbas to 
escape their social quandary in South Carolina abruptly ended.  They were now 
forced to find a place, to make their stand, where they were.  By joining the 
Confederacy, they declared their choice:  the white majority over the ignominy 
and shame of being considered dark-skinned, inferior, even as potential slaves.   
 In 1984, James H. Merrell traced this racial education of the Catawba in 
The Journal of Southern History.  His arguments appear to be compelling and 
historically sound.  The Catawbas’ perception of the increasing black population 
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changed dramatically over time, conditioned by their concurrent evolving 
relationship with the whites.  “In order to understand the origins and development 
of this relationship,” Merrell writes, “it is necessary to venture into the cultural 
frontier where Indian met African.”116  From the first white contact in 1540 
through about 1800, geographical remoteness limited Catawba contact with 
explorers, traders, and finally the coastal plantation society.  When contact did 
occur, the Catawba responded in seemingly contradictory ways, displaying both 
prejudice and tolerance.  But Merrell argues that this seemingly contradictory 
response of the Indians to the blacks at this early time should not be unexpected.  
At that time the tribe controlled the interior; outsiders were all collectively “the 
other,” whether English, Spanish, African, or French.  
These dynamics drastically changed in the early 1800s when the 
burgeoning cotton economy directly invaded the Catawbas’ Piedmont homeland.  
For the first time they observed directly the master-slave relationship.  In 1800, 
seeing a black person on the Catawba 144,000-acre tract would be extremely rare.  
By 1840, over two thousand blacks “lived on the Catawba land as slaves of white 
people who rented the Indians’ land.”  According to Merrell, “settlement of the 
Piedmont lifted the curtain shielding Catawbas from American culture.  For the 
first time talk of black inferiority must have reached Catawba ears as their white 
neighbors began to articulate a powerful and pervasive racial philosophy in the 
early nineteenth century.”117  Blacks were to be feared and avoided, lest the 
Catawbas became equated with the slaves in the white power structure’s eyes.  
Thus, Merrell agrees with Hudson that the Catawbas were the minority third race 
caught in the racial dynamics in the new cotton-slave economy.  Merrell expands 
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on Hudson’s foundation by elaborating on the origin and consequences of the 
Catawbas’ precarious status. 
 
By 1800 then, Catawbas had become an anomaly.  Neither useful or 
dangerous, neither black nor white, they did not fit into the South’s 
expanding biracial society.  To make matters worse, white fears of an 
Indian-black alliance faded and were replaced by a propensity to lump 
native Americans with Afro-Americans in a great “colored” underclass.  
No official policy arose that forced Catawbas to become blacks; but in a 
culture that recognized only two colors, the danger was always present, 
and the Catawbas became acutely sensitive to it.118 
 
A parallel might be drawn with the Lost Cause mystique of the defeated 
Confederacy.  Although vanquished by 1865, the Confederacy’s military legacy 
endured and was a significant dynamic after the Civil War for both veterans and 
citizens.  That legacy was preserved by Civil War remembrance ceremonies and 
organizations, and the continuation of the military tradition in Southern education.  
The Spanish-American War served as the opportunity for the former Confederates 
to demonstrate their commitment to fully rejoining the United States.  A similar 
dynamic can be seen with regards to the Catawbas’ total commitment to the 
Confederacy in 1861.  Proving their martial skill and attempting to forge stronger 
bonds in their estranged relationship with South Carolina, the Catawbas 
anticipated the same impulse that the former Confederates showed thirty-seven 
years later in the Spanish-American War. 
 Another possibility that could have occurred to the Catawbas in 1861 was 
the potential reward for their service and loyalty, the precedent being the 1763 
land grant after the Cherokee War.  In 1861, the Catawba might have felt, along 
with the rest of the South, a cautious optimism that their war for independence 
could succeed.  In that eventuality they would be in on the beginning of the new 
nation.  Redress of their land issues, direct monetary or material gain, even 
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possible political gains or improved status would make their service worthwhile 
and especially distinguish them from the slaves.  No proof exists for this but the 
early optimism of the people of the Confederacy.    
The Catawba Civil War soldiers were a part of the estimated twenty 
thousand American Indians who participated in the Civil War.  These Native 
Americans served in both the Union armed services and those of the CSA.  The 
families of those in the Confederate service suffered hardship and deprivation like 
the civilians of the South.  However, unlike the Catawba who served the 
Confederacy unswervingly, the other Southeastern Indian combatants and 
civilians showed a more nuanced reaction in that epic North-South conflict. 
 The Cherokee people in western North Carolina were the tribe most 
similar to the Catawbas.  Most of the Appalachian Cherokee were removed under 
the Treaty of New Echota in 1835, a part of the Trail of Tears.119  Those that 
remained were the same Cherokee who offered refugee to the Catawbas 
immediately after 1840.  They were known as the Oconaluftee Cherokee since 
their main encampment was at Quallatown, on the Oconaloftee River.  Today, 
they are known as the Eastern Band of the Cherokee.  Article 12 of the New 
Enchota Treaty had provided that those Cherokees who wished to remain would 
receive annuities provided they became citizens of the state in which they resided.  
At a period when no Indians enjoyed citizenship, this was thus impossible. 
 These North Carolina Cherokee had a strong advocate and protector in 
Colonel William Holland Thomas, however.  Born at Waynesville in 1805, his 
Revolutionary War father had died just before Thomas’s birth, and he was 
adopted by Cherokee Chief Yonaguska, who essentially became his surrogate 
father.  Taught the Cherokee language and culture, Thomas had the Cherokee 
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name Wil-Usdi, or “Little Will.”  Thomas built a prosperous trading company and 
acquired wide landholdings.  He also read law, and in 1830 became attorney for 
these Cherokee and served as their agent during the Removal period.  His 
advocacy for his people continued to the end of his life.  In the North Carolina 
Legislature from 1848 through 1861, he tirelessly fought for their assistance and 
citizenship. 
Thomas was one of only three legislators chosen as delegates to North 
Carolina’s secessionist convention, where that state left the Union on May 20, 
1861.  He then returned home to raise a company of mountain white and 
Cherokee soldiers.  At peak enrollment, this force numbered twenty-eight 
hundred, including over four hundred Cherokees and was known as Thomas’s 
Legion of Indians and Highlanders.  Their contribution to the Confederate War 
effort was crucial.  From 1862 on they controlled the mountain passes into 
Confederacy, effectively stopped Union spying and enlistment efforts in the area, 
and enforced the Confederate Conscription Act.  Thus they secured the Eastern 
theater of the South.120  On May 9, 1865, the Thomas Legion was the last 
Confederate unit east to surrender east of the Mississippi.  Eastern Cherokee 
historian John R. Finger emphasizes Thomas’s lifelong efforts: 
 
Without his assistance (the Cherokee) would never have remained in 
North Carolina.  Without his constant support they would never have 
acquired the lands they were fighting to retain.  Despite a normal measure 
of shortcomings, he was the best friend the Indians ever had.121 
 
 Unlike the Catawbas however, North Carolina Cherokee military support 
for the Confederacy was not unanimous.  An estimated thirty of them served in 
the Federal forces.  Some deserted after being captured as prisoners of war, while 
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others did not support slavery.  The Tennessee-North Carolina border area 
contained many who were sympathetic to the Northern cause, as there were in 
other areas of Appalachia.  The plantation-cotton economy that required slavery 
was almost non-existent in this section of the Southeast and full white support for 
the Confederacy was thus much attenuated.  The Cherokees’ splitting their 
support between the Union and the Confederacy was therefore consistent with 
that of their white neighbors.  The hostility engendered between the loyalist and 
rebel factions was a disruptive force in the Eastern Band’s efforts to reunite after 
the war.122 
 Still, other Southeastern Indians spurned Confederate pressures and, while 
not joining the Union Army, militarily aided the Federal forces.  The growing 
states’ rights movement in the antebellum South was a hallmark of the journey to 
Southern nationalism.  Like the slaves, Native Americans deeply felt the racist 
treatment that was part of this movement.  In 1835, after Nat Turner’s revolt, 
North Carolina’s Constitutional Convention defined Indians also as “persons of 
color,” and subsequent legislation stripped them of their rights, including those of 
property ownership and bearing arms.  Virginia also passed increasingly 
restrictive laws reducing the status of free Negroes and Indians.  By 1843, the 
Indians’ homelands were threatened.123  This increasing subjugation by the white 
supremacist power structure of both these states resulted in Native Americans 
having no reason to support the Confederacy. 
 When Union General George B. McClellan moved toward Richmond 
during the Peninsula Campaign of 1862, the Pamunkey Indians, part of the 
Powhatan Indian Empire in Virginia, willingly served the Union as noncombatant 
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pilots for land transport and warships.  Their knowledge of their homeland, 
especially around West Point, Virginia, enabled them to serve as Federal scouts.  
At least fourteen Virginian Powhatans were documented guides and pilots for the 
Union forces.  Of these, the exploits of Terrill Bradby are best known.  Bradby 
was the principal subject of anthropologist James Mooney in his study of the 
Virginia Indians in the 1890s.124  Bradby served first as a Union land guide in the 
Peninsula Campaign, and even worked with Pinkerton’s Secret Service.  In 1863, 
he enlisted in the United States Navy where he was a pilot in the North Atlantic 
Blocking Squadron.  Bradby was even awarded a Union pension to assist in his 
post-war life back in Virginia.125 
A similar Union sentiment was evident in North Carolina.  The Lumbee 
Indians lived in Eastern North Carolina.  A rail line connected this area directly to 
the lower Cape Fear River.  During the Civil War, this was the site of the 
Confederacy’s greatest military engineering endeavor.  A system of forts was 
built around Wilmington, a crucial port.  Most important was Fort Fisher, which 
was not captured until January of 1865.  These defensive structures were the focus 
of the Confederate impressments of slaves, free blacks, and Indians.  Almost 
every able Lumbee was forced to go to Wilmington.  Impressment helped 
coalesce and harden their dislike of the racist treatment they had endured.  Some 
of the Lumbee fled to the surrounding swamps, where they met with Union Army 
escapees from area Confederate prison camps to form a guerilla band.  From 1864 
on these guerrillas harassed the North Carolina Home Guard in that area, which 
enforced the repressive policies that angered them.  Eighteen-year-old Henry 
Berry Lowry was their leader.  The Lowry Band found itself directly in the path 
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of Sherman as he invaded the Carolinas in early 1865.  When Sherman entered 
North Carolina on March 8, 1865, the Lowry Band aided his Grand Army of the 
West as it advanced through the swamps in heavy spring rains, which was, as 
Sherman himself described it, the “damnest marching I ever saw.”126   
Lowry and his band were to keep on fighting long after 1865.  They turned 
their insurgent tactics against the racist white rule of the Reconstruction.  Lumbee 
historian and educator Adolph Dial has written of Henry Berry Lowry’s 
significance to his people:  “Henry Berry Lowry…While that name meant 
lawlessness and terror to the white community, it meant more truly a man who 
fought oppression to the Indians.  The ’King’ became a folk hero to his people, a 
symbol of pride and manhood.  Today, in honor of their outlaw-hero, the 
Lumbees annually give the Henry Berry Lowry Award to the citizen who best 
exemplifies the highest standard of service to the community.”127    
 The relocated Civilized Tribes were not spared from the devastation of the 
Civil War that ravaged their former homelands.  Beginning in Missouri with the 
Battle of Wilson’s Creek in August 1861, just two weeks after First Manassas, 
until the fighting at Second Cabin Creek in the Indian Territory on September 19, 
1864, fifteen significant engagements were waged in or near the Indian Territory.  
A major reason for this heightened activity was the Territory’s location just south 
of bloody Kansas, a key state for the Union and where the fighting was bitter 
between supporters of both Union and Confederate causes.  Like the rest of 
Americans, the former Southeastern tribes were forced to choose an allegiance.  
Once again, in contrast to the Catawbas, both the North and the South had Indian 
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military support in this region.  For the Cherokee Nation in the West, a tribal civil 
war erupted in the events and pressures of 1861-1865. 
In the first half of 1861, the Confederacy made persistent and persuasive 
overtures to all the Civilized Tribes, in large measure due to the skills of their 
negotiator Albert Pike.  In July, the Creeks, Choctaws, and the Chickasaws signed 
treaties with the Confederate States of America, transferring their loyalty and 
allegiance to the Southern cause.  Equally significant were both the offensive and 
defensive military alliances forged with the CSA.  These agreements signified an 
abandonment of the Federal government cause in the war.  Union loyalists were 
prominent in both the Creek and Cherokee Nations, but their influence failed to 
command the tribes’ support for the United States.  How these dynamics unfolded 
was telling about the condition and mindset of those Indians at this critical 
juncture. 
Part of the Southern allegiance had to do with slavery, as many of the 
tribal leaders of the Creeks and Cherokee were themselves slaveholders.  Thus, 
they felt a kinship with the Confederate cause and were economically vested in 
slavery like the planters.  In its February 7, 1861, Choctaw Council Resolution, 
the tribe stated its intent to join the South.  This represented, according to the 
Resolution, “the natural affections, education, institutions, and interests of our 
people, which indissolubly bind us in every way to the destiny of our neighbors 
and brethren of the Southern states.”128 
But the major reason for Indian support of the Confederacy was the 
widespread perception that the Federal government had abandoned them.  In their 
new lands, the national government was their protector and life source.  It was not 
a matter so much of what the Confederates did to court the Indians as it was the 
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failure of the administrations in Washington to support tribal members.  In 
particular, at this time the new Republican administration’s fervent anti-slavery 
stand sent shock waves through the slave-holding leaders of those tribes, much as 
it did through the Southern planter class.  The relocated Indians feared a Federal 
invasion and occupation of their new homelands.  The bitter process of relocation 
and its cost to the Indians by previous administrations left equally bitter memories 
and feelings toward those in power in Washington.  These emotions were 
reinforced by Washington’s failure to honor its treaty obligations.  Early 
Confederate military successes in the Indian Territory and Lincoln’s withdrawal 
from Territory military posts in May 1861 in order to protect Washington, D.C. 
and the Border States, left the Indian Nations feeling utterly abandoned.  All of 
these factors were exploited by Pike.  It was the United States that the tribal 
members felt threatened by, not the Confederacy.  
Opothleyahola, an influential Creek chief, had been a strong unionist, 
urging his people to support the Union cause and efforts.  In late 1861, he 
organized a band of Creek loyalists and together they set out to a promised 
protective fort in Kansas, with no Federal escort.  In this effort, a Confederate 
cavalry force of three regiments of Indians pursued them from all Five Civilized 
Tribes.  In three engagements between November 19 and December 26, 1861, the 
first Civil War fighting in Indian Territory, Opothleyhola’s people suffered severe 
death and causalities.  They straggled into Kansas finding an unprepared fort, 
scarce food and supplies, and the winter upon them.  The estimated seven 
thousand Creek loyalist refugees who survived were placed in a refugee camp, 
where starvation and the winter weather took another heavy toll.  Conditions got 
no better over the next three years, as the Creeks became victims of political 
disputes and graft in both Kansas and Washington.  In 1864, they were marched 
back to the Indian Territory and essentially left there.  Opothleyahola was 
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understandably bitter.  He wrote to Lincoln that the “Great White Father” 
(Lincoln and his predecessors) had broken pledges to his people for years.  They 
had been promised “in our new homes, we should be defended from all 
interference from any people, and that no white people in the whole world should 
ever molest us unless they came from the sky.  We do not hear from you.  The 
Government represented by our Great White Father at Washington has turned 
against us.”129 
John Ross, the Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation in the West, also 
harbored strong pro-Union feelings.  Ross initially pursued a policy of neutrality 
for his people.  The combination of Confederate pressure and lack of Union 
support that unfolded in 1861 doomed this policy, and he was forced to sign an 
alliance treaty with the Confederacy on October 7.  The internal conflict between 
the pro-Southern and pro-Union factions in the Cherokees had its origin in the 
Removal of the 1830s and the Treaty of New Enchota of 1835.  At that time, the 
Cherokee adamantly opposed to removal were led by John Ross and his 
followers.  Supporting removal was the Treaty Party, a faction led by the 
Cherokee Ridge family.  In spite of the opposition of a majority of Cherokee, the 
Treaty Party signed the Treaty of New Enchota, paving the way for Federal 
forceful removal and the Trail of Tears.  A bitter, deadly feud between these two 
groups ensued that lasted for ten years in their new homeland.  Ross’s supporters 
murdered the Ridge family members who had signed the Treaty, and leadership of 
the pro-removal Ridge faction passed to Stand Watie.  Intramural atrocities and 
reprisals continued until Ross and Watie signed the Treaty of 1846.  It recognized 
the right of Ross’s party to own land in the Cherokee Nation, pardoned those on 
both sides for any crimes, and set one government for all the Cherokee western 
                                                
129 Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians, 29. 
 72 
lands and peoples.  Under John Ross’s leadership the Cherokee prospered over 
the next fifteen years as agriculture and population thrived in the new lands. 
The internal conflict between Ross followers and those of Stand Watie, 
however, was never far below the surface.  With the outbreak of the Civil War 
these wounds reopened.  Ross wanted to continue his Nation’s ties with the 
Federal government.  Stand Watie was a major slaveholder, although few of his 
followers were, and supported the Confederacy.  Watie was successfully courted 
by Pike and became a colonel in the Confederate Army.  By July of 1861, even 
before all of the Confederacy alliances were signed, Watie was recruiting and 
training his Civilized Tribe warriors in the Indian Territory.  It was his Cherokee 
Mounted Rifles who inflicted the causalities on Opothleyahola and his followers 
as they fled to Union refuge in Kansas.  Watie’s units were major combatants in 
many other Trans-Mississippi battles and his military career achieved two 
distinctions.  He was the only Indian to attain the rank of Brigadier General in 
either army.  He was also the last Confederate general to surrender his army at 
Doaksville, Choctaw Nation, on June 23, 1865, three months after Appomattox.130 
John Ross and his supporters defected to the Union Army and its protection after 
the Battle of Pea Ridge in March 1862.  John Ross himself eventually spent the 
War in Washington, D.C.  He was technically under house arrest as a prisoner of 
war, but was able to confer with Lincoln on Indian affairs.  His intervention was 
key in the eventual release of the Cherokees from refugee status in Kansas.  
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The previous chapter demonstrates the singularity of the Catawbas among 
Southeastern Indians as having no Federal component in their relocation efforts, 
being solely dependent on their home state.  In the Civil War, that uniqueness 
continued, as they were the only Southern Indian people to give total and 
unfaltering support to the Confederacy. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
1866-1890—RECONSTRUCTION AND RECOVERY 
 
 If the Catawbas had hoped for recognition or reward in return for their 
loyal service to the Confederacy, they were disappointed.  In most ways, the years 
following the Civil War were a harsh continuation of the status quo.  The entire 
South was devastated by the costs of the war.  In its aftermath the Catawbas 
struggled like all other Southerners—merely to survive.  Just as for their former 
compatriots, the loss of so many young men as heads of families and wage 
earners precipitated drastic social and economic changes.  These practical realities 
demanded and captured everyone’s attention and the Nation found itself 
struggling to survive in even harsher economic conditions than in antebellum 
times.  But as historians have often remarked, the Catawbas had been survivors 
throughout their long history.   
 In the post-war period of 1866-1880, many of the same themes we have 
noted previously were continued by the Catawbas and the various white groups 
that impacted their lives.  As with organic systems, these common threads would 
grow and change.  The Nation’s members continued and strengthened their 
agency, especially going directly to the Federal and State governments to present 
their needs.  This willingness to initiate their voice in their affairs, which had been 
done previously with white help, now took an independent course.  Significantly, 
there also would be continuing indications of support and recognition during these 
dark times from their white neighbors, even if in non-monetary forms.  This 
would continue to contrast with the abandonment of tribal citizens by “official” 
South Carolina and those who did not know the Catawbas.  Some previous themes 
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would also return, but with new twists.  The struggle to hold the Tribe together in 
South Carolina would continue.  Emigration resumed, but the scattering of the 
Catawbas would now involve individuals and small family groups across the 
entire United States.  Also reemerging after Appomattox was the Catawba effort 
to find redress for the unkept promises of the Treaty of 1840.  Racism would 
continue and find a surprising new focus.  The Catawbas continued their efforts to 
distinguish themselves from the former slaves.  Now, for the first time, those 
endeavors would include the embrace of a white religion.  As with the 1840-1860 
period, we can break down these years by using the changing political control of 
South Carolina as our chronological marker:  the immediate war aftermath, 
Reconstruction, and finally from 1877 forward. 
 What political control existed immediately after April 1865 was primarily 
military.  Abrupt changes meant chaos to all South Carolinians, the Catawbas 
included.  The conditions endured by the Catawbas were captured by their agent, 
John R. Patton.  For the six years, from 1861 through 1866, he had been their 
advocate, continually providing for their needs and maintaining close personal 
contact.  Patton had gained the Indians’ trust so completely that his ability to keep 
affairs settled within their community led Governor Banham to exempt him from 
military service so that he could continue his work.  For reasons that are unclear, 
Patton resigned as agent in 1866.  Patton’s last report in 1866 was a grim 
evaluation of their situation.    
 
Their condition has not materially changed since his last communication 
to the General Assembly, except that their number is steadily decreasing, 
and those now remaining are in great destitution and want of all the 
necessities of life.  Only about sixty or seventy souls now remain of the 
once powerful tribe of the Catawbas.  During the present year some of 
them attempted to cultivate a part of the lands…and make crops of grain 
for subsistence, but owing to the long continued drought and want of rain 
the yield has been very inconsiderable.  The appropriation made at the last  
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regular session of the General Assembly for the support of said Indians 
during the present year was not received by the agent until the making up 
of his report.131 
 
 The “sixty to seventy souls” of 1866 compares with eighty-eight in 1840, 
a post-war decrease immediately of thirty percent.132  As before, state assistance 
would clearly be crucial factor for the destitute Catawbas.  But with 
Reconstruction, would de facto Federal control over the South Carolina 
government benefit the Catawbas?  Would the new regime take active measures 
to correct Catawba injustices, as it would do for the former slaves? 
 Prewar levels of state support through 1850 varied between $1800 to 
$2500.  By the mid-1850s, it had fallen to $1200-$1500.  During the first two 
years of the Civil War, it was still $1200.  Significantly, but not surprisingly, 
direct South Carolina payments to assist the Catawbas disappeared after 1862.  
From 1863 until Patton’s 1866 Report, there is no mention of any appropriation 
for the Catawba.  Finally, in 1867, $1200 was again earmarked.133  But by 1868, 
with the advent of Republican control the Reconstruction in state government, aid 
was again reduced to $600.  For the succeeding years up to the end of 
Reconstruction in 1877, the appropriation averaged $750 per year.  
Reconstruction assistance was significantly less than that provided by the 
antebellum state government.  The tribe lost about fifty to sixty-seven percent of 
its prewar aid.  The Catawbas thus did not benefit from Federal dominance of 
South Carolina in the immediate period after the Civil War.  The almost 
neglectful approach of all state regimes toward tribal members continued.     
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 The human side of this problem was shown by the petitions of the 
Catawba to better their condition during these years.  These pleas fleshed out their 
needs in their own words.  In the twenty-five years between 1840 and 1865, the 
Catawbas submitted only two petitions:  one was to the Federal government for 
relocation assistance, the other to South Carolina to retain John Patton.  In the 
next eleven years (1866-1877), however, they would submit no fewer than eight, 
a telling difference.  
 These petitions centered primarily on the actions of the Catawba Indian 
agents, as tribal members sometimes asked for a new agent, or raised doubts 
about the present one.  Equally impressive was the large number of supporting 
petitions by the white citizens of York and Lancaster counties.  Perhaps this was 
in gratitude for the tribe’s Civil War sacrifices.  As we have seen, the only 
previous petitions by local residents were submitted during the War itself, trying 
to include the tribe in any state assistance.  After the war, at least six petitions 
were either submitted by the whites or co-authored with the Catawbas.  In 
addition, the local legislators serving in Columbia significantly stepped up their 
support for the Catawba cause, helping to keep the attention of the state 
government on the Nation.134   
These Catawba petitions began very soon after the end of the Civil War.  
The first, in November 1866, to Governor Orr and the Senate, requested that 
Thomas Whitesides be appointed to succeed Patton.135  The Catawba voice was 
heard.  By 1867, Whitesides was writing to Orr that the Catawbas were destitute 
because Whitesides hadn’t been able to secure the appropriated funds for their 
behalf.  He wrote: 
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Heretofore the Agent reported to the Court, and the Court to the 
Legislature, (that) some families of the Indians are at this time in a very 
destitute condition, and it is not in my power to assist them.  I hope Your 
Excellency will advise or devise some means of relieving their necessities.  
I do not know under existing circumstances how or whether the 
appropriation made by the State can be obtained.136 
 
Apparently appropriation and actual payment had become two separate issues. 
The next petition, in February 1868, came from W. J. Clawson, a local 
white citizen of York County, who wrote directly to Governor Orr that many of 
the Catawba were starving and needed funds immediately.137  It was at this time 
that concerns with the agents began.  Orr answered Clawson by stating that he 
appreciated the Catawbas’ extreme condition, but he also questioned Whitesides’ 
good faith and called for an investigation.  Whitesides had failed to submit 
receipts, and Orr admonished him to keep better records, emphasizing that the 
Indians needed to be protected from fraud.  Orr withheld one half of the 
Catawbas’ $1200 appropriation.  They thus paid the price for his alleged poor 
paperwork, and soon afterwards, Whitesides resigned.  By mid-July 1868, now 
Governor R. H. Scott received another petition directly from the Catawba Council 
requesting the appointment of James Morrow to replace Whitesides.  In early 
1869, the York and Lancaster delegations also strongly supported this 
recommendation by the Indians.  Both were rebuffed when Scott named P. J. 
O’Connell.138  Douglas Summers Brown argues that Whitesides was an honest 
and caring agent, whereas O’Connell was not. 
 
During Reconstruction, Agent Thomas Whitesides, who had once 
furnished the Catawbas from his private funds when the state was in 
arrears, was replaced by “a corrupt and unprincipled” Irishman O’Connell.  
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The Indians claimed the Carpetbagger appointee withheld their 
allowances; however he was not removed or disciplined, as South 
Carolina was in the throes of Reconstruction.139 
 
Once again, South Carolina’s Reconstruction government was not benefiting the 
Nation’s citizens. 
 O’Connell’s First Annual Report in 1870 was accepted by the Legislature, 
but his Report of 1871 contained accounting irregularities.  Very soon thereafter, 
Governor Scott received two concurrent petitions from the Catawba Council and 
the citizens of York County requesting that O’Connell be replaced.140  
Additionally, Chief John Harris, a Civil War veteran, went to Columbia in 1871 to 
inform Governor Scott of the tribe’s concerns about O’Connell.  This marked the 
first time the Catawbas had personally lobbied in support of their wishes.  That 
visit was reinforced with the Petition of 1872, in which the entire Catawba 
Council strongly restated their misgivings that had not been addressed:   
 
We the subscribers of the Catawba Nation respectfully prayeth that your 
Excellency do grant or appoint Solomon Harris of Lancaster County…to 
be and act as our Agt. to see that we are not trespassed upon and to protect 
us in every respect.  If his Excellency remembers last July our Chief John 
Harris was down to see you, and his Excellency promised to remove our 
present Agt.  If he did not act right, which we are sorry to say he has not 
done.  Our object in asking for Mr. Harris is because he is a good citizen, 
and a Republican in politics.141 
 
 Finally, in December of 1872, P. J. O’Connell resigned.  Immediately, the 
local legislators wrote the new Governor, F. J. Moses, requesting that M. L. 
Owens replace O’Connell.  Apparently Owens proved just as flawed, for within a 
year, both the Catawbas and the white citizens of York and Lancaster demanded 
his removal for failing to distribute to the Catawbas the funds appropriated for 
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them by the Legislature.  And once again no action was taken.  In 1874, the 
Catawba Council repeated their entreaties to Governor Moses concerning both 
O’Connell and Owens.  The Indian headsmen alleged that Agent O’Connell had 
not passed along $1500 appropriated in 1871, and $800 in 1872.  In 1873, they 
charged that new Agent Owens had given them only $40 of total of $500 set aside 
that year for their use.  They recommended the replacement of Owens by William 
Whyte, someone they trusted.142  But once more, for the fourth time in five years, 
an appointee other that the one recommended by the Catawba and the whites was 
named.  R. L. Crook became Catawba Agent.143 
 The end of Reconstruction came when Congress enacted the Compromise 
of 1877.  The election of Wade Hampton, former Confederate general and hero, 
was the defining event of Reconstruction in South Carolina.  This shift was a 
symbolic marker of Redemption:  the rightful return of their State government to 
South Carolinians, a celebration of the spirit of the Lost Cause, and a conquering 
hero for South Carolina.  For the Catawbas, the question was whether conditions 
would be better for them with these milestone changes of 1877.  Many themes 
already examined in the Reconstruction era continued into this new time.  
Additionally, significant new ones appeared. 
 The Nation’s citizens continued to raise their own voices in the state 
affairs that concerned them.  Hampton had barely taken office in May 1877 when 
yet another petition came from the Catawbas.  In it they raised the hardship for the 
tribe under dishonest agents, and again asked that William Whyte be appointed.   
 
We the undersigned Catawba Indians of York County do most respectfully 
petition your Honorable Bodies to remove from office, as Agent, R. L. 
Crook, Esquire, of Rock Hill, because he has not treated us as we should 
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have been treated; 2nd, Because he has not distributed our funds 
appropriated by the state in a just and equitable manner.144 
 
 Whyte was appointed and served to 1882, when he was succeeded by A. 
E. Smith, who served into the late 1890s.  Thus, in the last twenty-three years of 
the century (post-Reconstruction), there again was continuity of leadership.  In 
1877, stability and continuity were reestablished, but funding did not improve.  It 
remained stagnant at $800 per year over the next thirty-five years.145  This amount 
would not have been sustaining even with normal economic pressures, much less 
the accelerated inflation suffered by the South in the aftermath of the War. 
An accurate reflection of the Catawbas’ condition and life at this time can 
be found in the 1880 Federal census.  Before 1880, the Nation had not been 
enumerated in the national census, since their status was considered as “Indians 
not taxed.”  That first official count listed only sixty Indian people living in 
Catawba Township, York County, South Carolina.  Close reading of that 1880 
census produces some telling observations.  The sixty surviving tribal members 
now lived in only thirteen houses on their essentially nonproductive tract of 630 
acres.  When noted, farmer (or farmhand) and keeping house or washerwoman 
were the only occupations listed for the Catawba men and women.  The age of the 
heads of household varied from eighteen to thirty, with most in their early 
twenties.  The exceptions to this youthful demographic were directly connected 
with the Civil War service of tribal members.  They were Peter Harris (age 49), 
Alec Tims (age 40), and the widow Sarah Head (age 37).  Peter Harris had been 
wounded at Antietam then captured at Petersburg.  He had spent the war’s 
duration as a POW at New York.  Alexander Timms had been wounded at Second 
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Manassas, then defended Petersburg.  Robert Head had succumbed to wounds and 
disease.146   
Another glimpse of the Catawba situation at this juncture can be seen in 
the journals of Albert S. Gatschet, a writer.  In 1881, Gatschet visited the 
Catawbas in York County and wrote of his visit: 
 
I reached the settlement of the Kata’ba Indians on the Western side of the 
Catawba River.  They now…inhabit an area of one square mile in the 
middle of the woods.  Of this area they have under cultivation not quite 
one half, on which they raise Indian corn, potatoes, and chiefly cotton.  
Their dwellings are log huts of one room each, with two doors, a rock or 
wood chimney, and no windows.147 
 
This mirrors the 1840 description by the Nations Ford Treaty negotiators, and also 
John Patton’s grim assessment in 1866.  The Catawbas had gained no material 
advance in their living conditions in forty-plus years.   
Despite this physical stagnation, major social changes were already 
underway by the 1880s.  Indeed, a far-reaching movement for the Catawbas was 
taking root.  From first colonization, settlers had been attempting to Christianize 
the “pagan” Catawbas.  These efforts had met with uniform failure, regardless of 
the time, person, or sect.   
 
Christianity and the church had made little progress among the Catawbas.  
Dr. Maurice Moore, writing about 1870, says “I was told not too many 
years since, by one who had preached to them himself, that though the 
Catawbas all understood the English language and missionaries of all 
denominations had faithfully preached the Word among them, not one, up 
to that time, ever professed conversion and became connected with a 
Christian church.148 
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This changed abruptly in the early 1880s when Mormon doctrine and 
teachings struck a responsive cord among the Catawba people.  Within a short 
time, a full ninety-five percent of them were actively practicing Mormonism, a 
number that has held steady until today.  The appeal of Mormonism to the 
Catawba is very revealing.  Chief Samuel Taylor Blue (1872-1952) explained as 
follows:  “They brought a book which is known as the Book of Mormon.  This 
Book was the direct history of our forefathers which we had no other history of 
before this book came along.”  Brown notes that Mormonism significantly held 
that the American Indians, like the white race, were descendants of the lost tribes 
of Israel.  As members of these chosen people, the Catawbas had standing above 
non-Israelite peoples, specifically the black race.  The separation from blacks and 
the unity with the whites in God’s selected peoples was the answer to their 
tenuous position in a biracial society.  Here was a religion that answered and 
ordained the Catawbas’ position, one that had been amorphous since the coming 
of the white man.  Brown notes that “Telling them that they were descendants of 
the lost tribes of Israel gave them a place—and a respectable place—among the 
peoples of the world.”   
Anthropologist Frank Speck noted the uniqueness of this phenomenon.  
 
The case of the Catawba is indeed a peculiar one in this respect…the only 
instance among American tribes known to us where conversion to the 
religion of the white man shifted a whole group from paganism to 
Christianity in the Mormon path.149 
  
 Mass religious conversion in a people who had resisted Christianity lends 
support to Hudson’s and Merrell’s theories about the Catawbas’ racial dilemma 
and their desire to be identified with whites only.  The component of Mormonism 
that appealed to the Catawbas was the oneness with whites as superior to blacks, 
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and even become a part of the anointed peoples and could even achieve 
“whiteness.”  George L. Hicks argues that an enthusiastic embrace of Mormonism 
follows naturally, even logically, from the findings of Hudson and Merrell. 
 
When Mormon missionaries visited the reservation in 1883 or 1884, the 
Catawba were introduced to an ideology of race that promised them 
mobility.  With their acceptance of Mormonism, the Catawba obtained the 
highest sanction of those beliefs about Negro inferiority that were already 
well-established in the tribe.  The two race ideologies, Mormonism and 
the Catawba of Southern racism fitted together without contradiction.  
Both considered the Negroes “an idle people, full of mischief,” and 
forbade intermarriage with them.  Mormonism added the agreeable notion 
that American Indians were one day to join Caucasians in the upper 
stratum.150 
 
The 1880s also saw a concerted effort by the Catawba Nation to finally 
secure a settlement and remuneration for the vast lands surrendered in 1840.  
South Carolina had never paid for the land it had seized.  The Catawba Chief at 
that time was Thomas Morrison, who continued the new Catawba technique of 
applying a more personal and direct approach.  The Rock Hill Herald reported on 
January 13, 1887, that Chief Morrison, along with Benjamin and William Harris, 
had gone directly to Columbia seeking a settlement of the Nations Ford Treaty of 
1840.  And this time they were accompanied by legal counsel.  Attorney J. Q. 
Marshall had been retained and went with the Harris brothers.151  But the 
Catawbas received no satisfaction in spite of repeated appeals by Nation 
representatives directly to the Governor and the South Carolina Legislature. 
 Approximately ten years later, these frustrating efforts at redress reached a 
new level.  This time, as in the attempts at resettlement west before the Civil War, 
the Catawba bypassed South Carolina and appealed directly to the Federal 
                                                
150 George L. Hicks, “Catawba Acculturation and the Ideology of Race,” Symposium on New 
Approaches to the Study of Religion-University of Pittsburgh-1964 (Seattle:  American 
Ethnological Society, 1964), 119. 
151 “The Catawba Indians Looking Up Their Rights,” Rock Hill Herald, January 13, 1887, 3. 
 86 
government.  The case for restitution came from a total of two hundred and fifty 
seven Indians of Catawba heritage living in the Creek and Choctaw lands of the 
Indian Territories and in western Arkansas.  They were the descendents of those 
Catawbas who had moved themselves west in the 1850s.  Meeting at Fort Smith, 
Arkansas, they had formed the Catawba and Non-reservation Indian Association, 
and sent a Memorial stating their case to the United States Congress. 
Their memorial declared that they were the members and the descendants 
those who had been members of the Catawba tribe of the Carolinas.  Under the 
provisions of the Indian Removal Act of 1848, they had come west where the 
Federal Government had promised them new homes and land, but had granted 
neither.  Consequently these Catawbas had been stranded in the Choctaw 
Territory and forced to seek livelihood without any land upon which they could 
build homes for themselves and their families.  The succeeding generations as a 
result were 
 
in great need, and are very anxious to be given lands, homes, or allotments 
in any of the lands that they are now or that may hereafter become 
available for that purpose in the Indian Territory or the Oklahoma 
Territory…and (are) entitled to receive in right, justice, or equity from the 
United States…new homes in the West or their lands in the East…and that 
such action be taken in their behalf. 
 
 Congress referred this matter for further investigation to the Department of 
the Interior’s Office of Indian Affairs.  In April 1888, Interior Commissioner D. 
M. Browning ruled that 
 
the Catawba Indians held their lands in South Carolina, under agreements 
or arrangements made with that State over which the Federal Government 
had no control or jurisdiction.” 152 
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Thus the Catawbas’ struggle for settlement of the Nations Ford Treaty was still 
being shifted between the Federal and South Carolina governments more than 
fifty years later.  Nothing had changed. 
 The Catawba Nation, born of the union of diverse, fragmented tribes of 
Southeastern Indian fragments uniting under them, had undergone, in turn, its 
own scattering.  Like other peoples before and after them, the Catawba have 
experienced their own diaspora across the United States.  This dispersion began in 
the 1840s with the retreat to North Carolina and the Cherokees, then to settlement 
with the Choctaws and other tribes in the Indian Territories.  It slowly resumed 
after the Civil War.  Often these dispersions occurred in family groups, and they 
emigrated for personal reasons.  The locations they chose were varied and 
numerous, not just to other Indian lands.  Civil War veteran Alexander Timms 
emigrated to Colorado in 1883, followed by the family of Private Robert Head.  
Head’s descendents moved from there to other states, especially Arizona and New 
Mexico.153  Many Catawbas moved to Utah in the wake of the conversion to 
Mormonism.  A century later, there were about fifteen hundred persons living in 
approximately twenty states who could claim Catawba heritage.  Most recently 
this trend has begun to reverse, with tribal members moving back to the 
Carolinas, attracted by better economic opportunities and renewed interest in their 
Indian heritage. 
 Across the South in the decades following the Civil War there occurred an 
outpouring of remembrance and pride in the Confederacy and its heroic veterans.  
These paeans took various forms, from monuments to parades, holidays to 
literature, and social clubs for those who served and also for their families.  
Multiple events and organizations attempted to keep alive the spirit of those times 
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and the people who had created it.  The people of York and Lancaster Counties 
were active participants in this celebratory and memorial process.  We have 
already seen two instances of this movement.  Both McCrady’s talk at Walhalla 
about the heroics of Gregg’s Brigade at Second Manassas, and McMaster’s 
spirited defense, at Chester, South Carolina, of Elliott’s Brigade at the Battle of 
the Crater were presented at CSA Company reunions.  In both instances, 
celebration was mixed with attempts at “correction.” 
 In the heady days after General Wade Hampton’s successful 1876 
campaign for Governor of South Carolina, and the subsequent ouster of the 
Radicals of Reconstruction, there was a marked increase in homage to the 
Confederacy and its ideals.  The Catawba Rifles of Rock Hill, one of a score of 
like-minded organizations across the South, was formed to provide a social format 
for these celebrations.  Although technically a unit in the State Militia, its main 
purpose appears to have been to sustain and honor the Confederate military 
tradition.  The fellowship of these organizations is captured by a 1903 article in 
the Rock Hill Journal.   
 
The Catawba Rifles have accepted an invitation to the military picnic to be 
given at Cornwell, S.C. Thursday, September 3rd.  They will leave here at 
10:45 and return that evening at 7:30 thus have a day’s outing of eight 
hours, a good dinner, and the pleasure of renewing acquaintances made at 
the encampment at Columbia.154 
 
Indeed, according to Brown, the Rifles held a military ball every year.  
She quotes from one account: 
 
The evening of May 14, 1885, was a gala occasion for the military in Rock 
Hill and was long remembered as a time of much enjoyment and pleasure.  
The afternoon was set apart for the inspection of the Catawba Rifles by 
General Manigault.  At six o’clock the battalion was formed on Main 
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Street under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A. H. White, of the 
Palmetto Regiment, and the line marched…  
 
At nine o’clock that night Roddey’s Hall, which had been tastefully and 
appropriately decorated for the occasion, was thrown open and an 
assemblage of fair women and brave men soon gathered, and at ten 
o’clock the ball presented a brilliant scene.155 
 
There was no mention of any Catawbas in the Catawba Rifles, nor were any 
mentioned in the records of those attending any of these celebratory 
commemorative events. 
 In similar manner, the Original Roll of Membership for the Catawba 
Camp # 278, United Confederate Veterans Association, Rock Hill, South 
Carolina, lists one hundred and six former soldiers as charter members.  They 
were primarily from the Carolinas, but also Arkansas, Alabama, and Georgia.  
However, no actual Catawba veterans were members of the Catawba Lodge of the 
United Confederate Veterans Association.156 
Indeed, there is a sharp contrast between the inclusion of white and Indian 
CSA veterans in these events and organizations.  The vast majority of Catawba 
soldiers were not asked to be a part of the honoring celebrations.  Blumer 
mentions that Alexander Tims, in 1880, attended his company’s reunion,157 but he 
does not cite his source for this statement and there is no confirmation in a 
newspaper or in a contemporary account.  Probably more significant is the denial 
to them of any fellowship and help for any psychological effects that certainly 
were a part of the combat experience.  If the Catawbas attempted this healing 
comradeship, they apparently did it in isolation among themselves.  
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But tangible benefits associated with the Lost Cause movement were 
available to the Catawbas.  South Carolina was among the states of the former 
Confederacy to initiate pension benefits for their Civil War veterans and their 
spouses.  A limited relief effort commenced in 1888.  Subsequently coverage was 
expanded twice.  By then there were only two surviving Catawba widows to 
benefit from pension supplements.  Nancy Harris, now 70, and Sarah Harris, 65, 
were officially listed as beneficiaries by the South Carolina Comptroller General 
in 1901.  Both their husbands had served in Company H, 12th South Carolina 
Volunteers.  Eight years later only Sarah Harris survived, receiving a monthly 
pension of $19.75.158 
Additionally, South Carolina had started an artificial limb replacement 
program for amputees in 1867, and continued it for forty years.  Approximately 
three hundred approved prosthesis applications survive, and they were collected 
into a book by Patrick J. McCawley, an archivist with the South Carolina 
Department of Archives and History.  No Catawba soldiers are listed among the 
recipients.159   
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, an unusual phenomenon 
occurred in the Rock Hill-Fort Mill area.  Of their own initiative the citizens there 
erected a monument to their neighbors, the Catawba people.  Prominently 
featured on this memorial were the names of the Indian soldiers who had fought 
and died for the Confederacy.  Another side had plaques commemorating the 
Catawbas who had always aided the white settlers and who had served in the 
Revolutionary War.  This limestone and brass-plated obelisk was placed 
alongside three other monuments.  Those erected previously honored the other 
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Southerners:  Confederate veterans, women, and the slaves.  All had been placed 
in the 1890s, with the cresting of the memorial movement.  Again, the only 
commemoration of the Catawba soldiers sacrifice came from their neighbors, the 
citizens of York and Lancaster Counties. 
The Catawba Memorial was dedicated on July 31, 1900, with a large 
gathering in attendance.  The Columbia State was there and reported the day’s 
events.  A portion of that article directly addressed the fifty Catawbas who 
attended the ceremony: 
 
And Ben Harris, a son of John Harris, one of the bravest members of the 
Twelfth South Carolina, delivered the speech.  The speech was written by 
him and is a specimen of what an Indian can do. 
 
The Indians were given a fine dinner and deported themselves well…Ben 
Harris, son of Confederate veteran, then spoke. 
 
He said (that) the Catawbas never took part against him (the white man) 
but helped him in all life, in all wars, in the Revolution, and when they 
sent 20 braves to the Civil War…If the white man had done the Indian 
justice…a good many of them would have been educated and able to make 
a good speech.160 
 
Even at this ceremony honoring and remembering the faithful Catawba 
Nation, the stereotype of Indians as primitive and inferior comes through for the 
writer, just as it did for the New York Times editorial writer forty years previously.  
What was notably different was the change that had occurred in the Catawbas in 
the interval.  That new assertiveness is apparent in Ben Harris’s address.  His 
pointed and public admonishment for the failure of the whites to respond to the 
Catawba sacrifices, and the consequences to his people of those broken promises 
and trust, was a timely example of this awakening.   
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This post-war experience of both the Catawba soldiers and the tribe as a 
whole contrasted sharply with that of other North and South Carolina Indian 
peoples.  This historiographical examination shows the uniqueness of the total 
Catawba commitment to South Carolina’s course in the Civil War.  Unlike the 
Catawbas, whose Civil War military support failed to change South Carolina’s 
treatment of them, North Carolina acted quickly to recognize the Civil War 
support of the Eastern Band Cherokees.  Its General Assembly formally 
recognized the Cherokees’ right to North Carolina residency on February 19, 
1866.  Their act declared “That the Cherokee Indians who are now residents of 
the State of North Carolina, shall have the authority and permission to remain in 
the several counties of the State where they now reside; and shall be permitted to 
remain permanently therein so long as they may see proper to do, any thing in the 
treaty of eighteen hundred and thirty-five to the contrary not withstanding.”161  
The last part referred to the Treaty of New Enchota.  This right had never been 
specifically affirmed by North Carolina, leaving tribal members in limbo as far as 
being able to stay in their homelands if they so desired. 
Two significant factors, however, were markedly absent from this 
reassurance.  Actual citizenship and its rights was not a part of North Carolina’s 
declaration.  Secondly, at this time disease epidemics, ruined farmland, and lack 
of food and clothing caused the tribal members to fall into a demoralized 
factionalism.  They were continuing to keenly experience all the depravations of 
war.  They required urgent assistance, not a vague, even if welcomed, reassurance 
about being able to stay.  Fortunately a new advocate now assumed Thomas’ 
former role.  Headsman George Busheyhead applied to North Carolina for a 
permanent reservation and the needed assistance.  Refused, he then turned his 
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efforts to the Federal Indian agencies.  Officials there responded that the Eastern 
Band Cherokee were North Carolina’s responsibility, even without citizenship.  
Instead these administrators again raised the possibility of removal and thus 
Federal stewardship.  Thirty years after avoiding the 1830s push for removal, the 
specter of forced relocation became a distinct possibility once again for the 
Eastern Band Cherokees.  The Fourteenth Amendment gave citizenship to anyone 
born in the United States and under its jurisdiction.  The 1868 North Carolina 
Constitution granted the right to vote to anyone born in the United States, over 
twenty-one years old, and a resident of the state for at least a year.  Despite these 
measures, Cherokee status concerning North Carolina citizenship and rights 
remained murky.  Busheyhead persisted in Washington until Congress finally 
recognized the North Carolina Cherokee as a distinct tribe on July 27, 1868.  The 
Eastern Band Cherokee were now under Federal protection and support.  
Discussions of removal turned to finding a permanent reservation.  (By marked 
contrast, the Catawbas gained United States citizenship in 1934, and Federal 
recognition as a distinct tribe in 1943-1944.)162  For the Cherokee, it took an 
additional seven years to work through internal conflicts, Federal and state 
bureaucracy, and the settlement of outside land claims before their Quallatown 
home area became the Qualla Boundary Reservation in 1875.  Additional lands 
were added over the next five years.  The title to the Reservation was vested in the 
Eastern Band in common and was unalienable except by the consent of both the 
Cherokee Council and President.163 
 The Eastern Band Cherokee were active participants in the Lost Cause 
commemorative associations and activities that bracketed the decades at the turn 
of the twentieth century.  Cherokee veterans formed the United Confederate 
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Veterans in 1900.  Its name was later changed to honor Sou-noo-kee, a Cherokee 
Confederate soldier killed at Cumberland Gap in defense of their mountain 
homeland.  Multiple photographs exist showing the Cherokee at reunions of 
Confederate veterans.   
 The Lumbee Indians of the coastal North Carolina area experienced a 
Reconstruction period markedly different than North Carolina’s Cherokees.  The 
Lowry guerrilla group did not cease fighting after assisting Sherman.  Military 
hostilities ended in 1865 but the Lowry Band continued its paramilitary efforts 
against the repression directed at Indians and former slaves under the new white 
power structure.  Reconstruction lasted until 1875 in North Carolina and their 
counteroffensive continued during that decade.  The Lowry Band found that their 
efforts were necessary to counteract the “new” white racist power structure that 
evolved after the Civil War in the South.  The Lumbee, like the Catawbas and all 
Southeastern Indians, were considered people of color, and deeply and adversely 
affected under the emerging force of Jim Crow society.  W. McKee Evans 
chronicled this period in his study To Die Game-The Story of the Lowry Band, 
Indian Guerrillas of Reconstruction.  The racist culture and segregation that arose 
in the postwar period necessitated the Lowry Band’s continued challenges to its 
repression.  “Once a larger political process got underway…The Radical ideas 
that once inspired Union soldiers were no longer needed when the antebellum 
power had been smashed and a new one established.  The Whiggish business 
leaders, now as firmly in control of the Republican Party as that party was in 
control of the nation, were beginning to develop a queasy feeling about their 
earlier commitment to civil rights.  One by one they began to lay aside their 
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Radical ideas.  The Lowrys opposed…the party’s dominant policy of piecemeal 
accommodation to the new, avowedly racist southern power structure.”164 
 The Lowry Band had members other than the Lowrys.  Several of the 
guerillas were fellow Lumbee and both poor whites and blacks.  Escaped Union 
POWs from the Florence, South Carolina military prison joined in the insurgent 
action.  Able to disappear into the region’s swamplands and aided by local black 
and Indian communities, they practiced a protective, active and violent resistance.  
This significant response, so different than that of the Catawbas, is noted by 
Laurence Hauptman:  “Unlike their Indian neighbors the Catawba of South 
Carolina, they chose to fight back against a Southern white supremacist order that 
surrounded and enslaved them.  Indeed, their stance as guerrillas in the Civil War 
era separates them from most other Southeastern Indians.”165 
 In Virginia, a brief window of opportunity to hold public office opened for 
the Pamunkey and other Powhatans during Reconstruction.  In 1872, Pamunkey 
headsman Ferdinand Wynn served for a few months as road supervisor in Tyler 
Township, Charles City County.  The Pamunkey also started a cooperative 
Reservation store in 1874-75, using money they had received in compensation for 
damages as a result of Civil War combat.  The Pamunkey Indians who assisted 
the Union forces in the Peninsula Campaign were never enlisted sailors or soldiers 
in either army; and, therefore, not a part of the memorial and fraternal aspects of 
the Lost Cause or the Grand Army of the Republic. 
In the 1890s, the Smithsonian Institution became interested in preserving 
the culture and language of various Southeastern Indian peoples.  James Mooney 
and Albert Gatschet were responsible for much of our understanding of the 
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Catawbas in this time.  Joined by John Garland Pollard, they also visited the 
Pamunkey Indians and other Powhatan tribes.  Among their findings was the 
same antipathy and distancing from the now-former slaves that the Catawbas so 
strongly experienced.  The Pamunkeys refused to associate with blacks and even 
had a tribal law that prohibited blacks from attending the tribal schools and 
churches.  Pollard notes, “No one who visits the Pamunkey could fail to notice 
their race pride.  Though they would probably acknowledge the whites as their 
equals, they consider the blacks far beneath their social level.”166 
 The Cherokee Indians who lived within the Indian Territory faced a 
unique situation with the end of the Civil War.  Technically, they had seceded to 
join the Confederacy.  Even John Ross and his followers had signed the treaty 
with the Confederate States of America before seeking Federal refuge.  In the 
corridors of Congress many were intent on punishment for the Cherokee.  Senator 
James Harlan presented a bill to abolish all antebellum Indian treaties and 
consolidate all the Civilized Tribes under one government in the Indian Territory.  
William P. Dole, Commissioner of Indians under Lincoln, fought this attempt, 
citing that without the treaties there would be no Indian right over their land, 
leaving the Territory open to anyone.  The Harlan Bill passed the Senate on 
March 2, 1865, but never reached debate in the House.167 
In September 1865, the new Indian Commissioner Dennis N. Cooley 
called for a meeting with the Five Civilized Tribes at Fort Smith in present day 
Arkansas.  There Cooley relayed President Andrew Johnson’s hopes and plans for 
a peaceful reunion with the National government, like that of the other 
Confederate soldiers.  New treaties were to be negotiated to accomplish this goal.  
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Caught by surprise and unprepared to negotiate, the Indian representatives signed 
an understanding of friendship agreeing to proceed, and repudiated their 
Confederate treaties. 
 During the first half of 1866, treaties were again signed with all five of the 
Civilized Tribes.  In these new agreements the Indians gave up land parcels to 
provide room for other tribes, freed their slaves and pledged to provide for them, 
established a general council of all the tribes, and provided for railroad corridors 
through the Indian Territory.  For all the Nations except the Cherokee, 
reunification was uneasy but relatively uncomplicated, helped by the fact that they 
had never split into loyalist and secessionist factions.  The Cherokees’ 
fundamental schism during the Civil War burdened them with hostile feelings and 
memories.  Cooley called for further negotiations.  At first a split of the Cherokee 
Nation into Northern and Southern entities was proposed, but was rejected by 
President Johnson.  Further compromise finally resulted a treaty with the whole 
Cherokee Nation on July 27, 1866, ten days after John Ross died.  The unity of 
the Cherokee had been secured, although animosity continued for years.168 
There are two monuments in Tahlequah, Indian Territory (now 
Oklahoma).  Tahlequah was the terminus of the Trail of Tears and became the 
capital of the Cherokee Nation.  One honors John Ross, the Cherokee Principal 
Chief throughout the post-removal and Civil War periods.  A short distance away 
is a memorial to Stand Watie, the Cherokee warrior. 
The immediate postwar period for Southeastern Indians was in many 
aspects a continuation of their response to the crisis precipitated by the Civil War.  
Both the Indian Territory Cherokee and the Eastern Band Cherokee struggled to 
heal the wounds of their internal schisms that resulted from their split allegiance.  
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There was no such deep division for the Catawbas, the only Southern tribe totally 
supportive of the Confederacy.  During this time the Eastern Band Cherokees 
were rewarded with both North Carolina citizenship (in spite of some members 
supporting the North) and also gained Federal tribal status and protection (again 
in spite of the remainder serving the Confederacy).  Even with no divided loyalty, 
the Catawbas achieved neither.  They continued their struggle for aid through 
petitions and personal lobbying, only to receive less for a once-again growing 
tribal family.  The Lumbee continued their guerrilla tactics in active resistance to 
further persecution force upon them by the racists in power during 
Reconstruction.  In contrast the Catawbas did not attempt any known resistance to 
similar forces in South Carolina.  The sharp difference in both the war and 
postwar eras between the Catawba and the other tribes would seem to indicate 
that the Catawbas had a reason to fully embrace the Confederacy that was not 
present for other native peoples.  The Lumbee joined former slaves and freedmen 
in their paramilitary unit, and blacks that were associated with the Indian 
Territory Cherokee would have been slaves.  The Catawbas were faced with a 
unique racial quandary in the highly charged biracial society of South Carolina.  
Their actions were their written word, and their singular response to the Civil War 
lends support to the idea that those actions were motivated by the felt need to 
separate and distance themselves from what they perceived as the greatest threat 
to their survival as a race. 
The Catawbas’ continual fight to preserve their self-identity in the rapidly 
evolving 19th century society of their homeland is the heart of this thesis.  As the 
biracial Southern structure coalesced in the 1800s, the Catawbas correctly 
perceived that their survival as a distinct people depended on association and 
identification with the dominant white faction.  Any other status would mean 
essential extinction as a people.  In the ante-bellum South this involved adopting 
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the white racial orthodoxy, especially distinguishing themselves from the blacks.  
Failure to do so would mean permanent exclusion from that new society.  As 
Brown notes, the Catawbas perception was alarmingly accurate.  There definitely 
was “a tendency to equate Catawbas with blacks, a tendency that threatened the 
very existence of the Nation.”169  They had to do whatever was necessary to 
distance themselves from blacks in that racial triangle that had entangled them.  
 It is deeply ironic that these native people without any inherent prejudice 
had to resort to that tactic against a fellow-persecuted group.  The Indians and the 
blacks actually shared a common condition and fate.  Alexis de Tocqueville noted 
this in his 1835 Democracy in America.  DeTocqueville was studying American 
government and politics, which often involved mentioning the role and place of 
black and Indian Americans. 
 
These objects, which touch on my subject, do not enter into it; they are 
American without being democratic, and above all it is democracy that I 
wanted to portray. 
 
These two unfortunate races have neither birth, nor face, nor language, nor 
mores in common; only their misfortunes look alike.  Both occupy an 
equally inferior position in the country they inhabit; both experience the 
effect of tyranny; and if their miseries are different, they can accuse the 
same authors for them.170 
 
DeTocqueville’s insight was very perceptive.  He realized that both black and 
Indian Americans shared this exclusion, and he felt neither would ever be able to 
effect a change in their condition.  The Catawbas appear to have attempted to 
steer a middle course, seeking to be associated with whites while at the same time 
preserving their distinct identity.  The white settlers used both Indian land and 
slave labor to build their “new world,” constructing their society on the backs of 
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both peoples.  One can easily understand why the colonists feared a joint uprising 
by both.  What is surprising, and indeed ironic, is the Catawbas’ deep antipathy 
toward their fellow sufferers.  This is tellingly indicative of the force of the racial 
paradigm.  
 In a real sense, religion served post-war in the Catawbas’ continuing 
efforts to be identified with the white-dominant social power base.  The 
hypothetical question of where the Catawbas would have served if there had been 
black units in the CSA is very thought provoking.  Given the long, visceral history 
of Southern fear of armed slave uprisings, active colored military service for the 
blacks was a moot point in the Confederacy.  What is significant is that the 
Catawbas, always loyal warriors except during the Yamasee War, were entrusted 
with arms and munitions.  But that remarkable difference from the slaves did not 
prevent their exclusion from significant aspects of white society. 
 Elements of paternalism were operative in the Catawba-white Carolina 
relationship.  The personal nature of paternalism as described by Genovese was 
very influential in the prewar and Civil War years.  If not for the efforts of many 
local York County citizens, the Indian agents, certain governors, and others like 
David Hutchison, the tribe would have been totally abandoned after 1840.  The 
Catawbas were also able to partially counteract the self-destructive nature of the 
paternalism they encountered.  Genovese emphasizes the temporizing effect of 
religion for the slaves:  “The slaves forged weapons of defense, the most 
important of which was a religion that taught them to love and value each other, 
to take a critical view of their masters, and to reject the ideological rationales for 
their own enslavement.”171  The Catawbas kept their sense as a distinct people 
through the memory and emphasis of their Nationhood and strong warrior past.  
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Their proud history seems to have served the same function as religion did for the 
slaves.  Unlike the slaves, they had a significant past of power and culture in 
South Carolina.  This served as mitigating and protective value for the Indians 
during this period. 
 Christianity was not the central unifying force during the struggle as it was 
for the slaves.  In a real sense, religion served in the Catawbas’ continuing post-
war efforts with the dominant white social-power base. 
 
Mormonism gave the American Indians a special place.  The Book of 
Mormon purported to be an account of the Indians’ ancestors.  It predicted 
that they could become “a white and delightsome people” if they accepted 
church teaching.  At the same time, Mormon scripture said that those upon 
whom “the Lord God did cause a skin of blackness to come” were “an idle 
people, full of mischief.”  Thus to the Catawbas the Mormon doctrine 
encouraged their efforts to distance themselves from blacks while at the 
same time supporting their desire to become more like whites, a course 
they had already been following for years.172 
 
For the Catawbas, after centuries of total resistance to white missionaries, to 
suddenly and totally embrace a religion, it must have spoken to a deeply felt need.  
This acceptance by the vast majority of the tribe supports Merrell’s contention 
that learned racial attitudes from whites underpinned their response to the 
upheaval thrust upon them in the 1800s.  The Catawbas’ solution was a byproduct 
of and the most significant factor in their adaptation to their changing condition 
during this period.   
 Another aspect of paternalism helps in understanding why the Catawbas 
supported the Confederacy with their lives.  In their long relationship with South 
Carolina a mutual bond had formed, analogous to that of the slaves and masters 
described by Genovese:  “A paternalism accepted by both masters and 
slaves…afforded a fragile bridge across the intolerable contradictions inherent in 
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a society based on racism, slavery, and class exploitation.”173  Substitute 
“Catawbas” for “slaves” and that implicit bond gives insight into the Indians’ 
seemingly unfathomable actions of support throughout 1861-1865. 
Of course, the Nation from colonial times had always associated with the 
whites.  This too had been their initial, intuitive response long before the cotton-
slave economy of the 1800s.  This tradition of military aid to the white society 
was extended with their Civil War service.  That loyalty would appear to be a 
separate impulse and not related to racial issues.  The evolving racial society 
spurred efforts to enhance these established bonds with the whites.  With the 
coming of the Secession crisis, the Catawbas’ long tradition of support for the 
white government fused with the more recent search for identity in the new 
racially-charged order.  The result was their Confederate service that initially 
appears so mysterious and incomprehensible. 
This thesis began with the idea of exploring the rationale and course of the 
Catawba military service to the Confederacy.  That vision expanded as the study 
clearly showed that their Civil War experience was only a part of the significant 
changes that the Catawbas experienced between 1840 and 1890.  The profound 
reshaping of their lives endured by the Catawba people in these years is 
comparable to their other watershed period of 1670-1770, when they were 
decimated by war and disease.  In addition to their struggle to remain a distinct 
people, the Catawbas also endured the continuous conflicts of race in a new 
society, as well as their emergence as a people with their own voice, religion and 
diaspora.  In each period they were threatened with marginalization, even 
extinction.  Exploring their responses and motivations has made for a rewarding 
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study that lends insight into a unique element in the history of South Carolina, the 
South, and the United States. 
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